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NOTES AND COMMENTS
Admiralty-The Ocean of the Air Revisited
In the embryonic stage of air travel there was uncertainty as
to what body of law should control its development. The theory
arose that the air surrounding the earth was an ocean in itself and
therefore properly the subject of maritime jurisdiction.' This
theory was never generally accepted, and as early as 1921 Judge
Cardozo, analyzing the characteristics of a hydroaeroplane,2 deter-
mined that although it qualified as maritime while afloat "a hydro-
aeroplane, while in the air, is not subject to the admiralty . . .
because it is not then in navigable waters, and navigability is the
test of admiralty jurisdiction."' Other courts followed suit by hold-
ing that an "amphibian plane' 4 and "overseas transport flying
boat"' were not "vessels" 6 within the purview of admiralty juris-
diction. As a result of such consensus of opinion, the commerce
clause of the Constitution, not maritime law,7 became the basis for
federal legislation involving air travel.8
This theory was revised in the recent case of Notarian v. Trans
World Airlines.' The plaintiff, Mrs. Notarian, ° was a passenger
on a direct transoceanic flight from Rome, Italy, to Pittsburgh,
Pennsylvania. She was returning to her seat from the rest-room
when the airplane was "jolted violently,"'" and personal injury re-
'Wilson v. Transocean Airlines, 121 F. Supp. 85, 91-92 n.23 (N.D. Cal.
1954).
2 Reinhardt v. Newport Flying Serv. Corp., 232 N.Y. 115, 133 N.E. 371
(1921).8Id. at 118, 133 N.E. at 372.
'Dollins v. Pan-Am. Grace Airways, Inc., 27 F. Supp. 487 (S.D.N.Y.
1939).
"Noakes v. Imperial Airways, Ltd., 1939 Am. Mar. Cas. 1048 (S.D.N.Y.
1939).
"'Transactions are maritime only when connected with a 'vessel.'"
RoDixsoN, ADmIRALTY § 8 (1939).
Admiralty jurisdiction was opposed on the rationale that "aerial naviga-
tion is more akin to transportation on the earth's surface than it is to sea
travel . . . ." Bogert, Problems in Aviation Law, 6 CORNELL L.Q. 271, 304
(1921).
'The Air Commerce Act, 44 Stat. 568-76 (1926), as amended, 49 U.S.C.
§ 176 (1964).
:244 F. Supp. 874 (W.D. Pa. 1965).
'
0 Her husband was also a plaintiff.
"1 244 F. Supp. at 875.
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sulted. The aircraft was unaffected by the disturbance and con-
tinued to its destination. The suit for failure to provide a "reason-
ably safe passage"' 2 was brought in admiralty, although there was
no physical contact between the airplane and the ocean.
The defendant acknowledged numerous maritime cases involv-
ing aircraft 3 but contended that contact with the water is essential
for admiralty jurisdiction. The court referred to the "ocean of the
air theory" and the fact that the Death on the High Seas Act,14 a
maritime law, has been applied to air travel where no contact with
the water was present. 5 Relying on D'Aleman v. Pan Ant. World
Airlines'6 it said :.
[I]t has been held that the Death on the High Seas Act grants a
right of action in admiralty for death caused by wrongful act,
neglect or default occurring in the air space over the high
seas .... [W]hether a plane comes in actual physical contact
with the sea does not matter. What does matter is that the
cause of action occurs over the sea."
Holding that admiralty jurisdiction was properly invoked, the
court declared that the question of necessity for contact with the
water has never been settled and admiralty has a long history of
altering its boundaries when necessity and progress demand.
Assuming that the expansion of admiralty jurisdiction autho-
rized in Notarian would be generally received, what are the conse-
quences to personal injury claimants such as Mrs. Notarian?
At present suits of this nature are usually governed by the War-
saw Convention.' A significant element of this international agree-
'- Ibid.13R.g., Trihey v. Transocean Air Lines, 255 F.2d 824 (9th Cir. 1958)
(plaintiff's decedent died in a crash in the Pacific Ocean); Noel v. Linea
Aeropostal Venezolana, 247 F.2d 677 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 907
(1957) (death resulting from a crash off the New Jersey coast). The
defendant in Notarian contended that the case came within the purview of
the Warsaw Convention, but the court held that this was insufficiently
pleaded and not to be considered. For the significance of this determination
see notes 18-21 infra and the accompanying text.
1' 41 Stat. 537-38 (1920), 46 U.S.C. §§ 761-68 (1964). The act provides
for suit in the district courts, in admiralty, when death occurs "on the
high seas beyond a marine league from the shore of any State, or the
District of Columbia, or the Territories or dependencies of the United
States." 41 Stat. 537 (1920), 46 U.S.C. § 761 (1964).
" Choy v. Pan-Am. Airways Co., 1941 Am. Mar. Cas. 483 (S.D.N.Y.
1941).1 259 F.2d 493 (2d Cir. 1958).
17244 F. Supp. at 877.
IS Warsaw Convention, July 31, 1934, 49 Stat. 3000, T.S. No. 876. See
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ment is the limitation on the amount of recovery in personal injury
claims to 125,000 French francs.'9 This is the equivalent of 8,300
dollars.2 In jurisdictions where tort recoveries are often generous,
an injured plaintiff may find that the limitation makes his compen-
sation considerably less than it would be if the same injury had been
sustained in another mode of transportation. In fact, the severity
of this limitation has resulted in the proposed rejection of the con-
vention by the United States as of May, '1966, if the maximum
recoverable amount is not raised.2
An aspect of admiralty law that is clearly not appropriate in
cases of personal injury or death to airplane passengers while flying
over the high seas is the right of a shipowner to the benefits of the
Limitation of Liability Act.2 Under that act the liability of the
owner of a vessel for any loss that was occasioned without his
privity or knowledge" is limited to the value of his interest in the
vessel and pending freight with the further proviso that in cases
of personal injury or death the limitation fund shall in no event be
less than sixty dollars per ton of the vessel's gross tonnage. Ton-
nage for admiralty purposes refers to the internal space of a vessel,
not its weight. An admiralty ton is one hundred cubic feet of
space 24
Considering the relatively small internal capacity of a passenger
aircraft, the inequity of applying the above criteria for limitation
of liability to air travel is obvious.2 5 It can be argued that the possi-
bility of such application was never contemplated by Congress and
U.S. CivIL AERONAUTICS BD., AERONAUTICAL STATUTES AND RELATED MA-
TERIAL 290-331 (rev. ed. 1959). The convention is an international agree-
ment regulating air travel between the participating nations. The original
convention was held October 12, 1929.
"Warsaw Convention, art. 22(1).
"Koninklijke Luchtvaart Maatschappij N.V. KLM v. Tuller, 292 F.2d
775 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 921 (1961).
"Time, Oct. 29, 1965, p. 98. The United States proposal for elevating
the limitation is for an immediate raise to $75,000 with an ultimate ceiling
of $100,000.
229 Stat. 635 (1851), as amended, 46 U.S.C. §§ 181-89 (1964).
"There is much litigation involving the interpretation to be placed on
the words "privity or knowledge." See Coryell v. Phipps, 317 U.S. 406,
410 (1943); and 3 BENEDICT, AD-mRALTY §§ 489-90 (6th ed. 1940).
" Inman S.S. Co. v. Tinker, 94 U.S. 238, 243 (1876).
" The manner of ascertainment of the internal capacity in tons is equally
foreign to aircraft. It is couched in such nautical terms as "the inside of
the plank on the stem timbers . . . the rake of the bow in the thickness of
the deck ... the rake of the stern timber in one-third of the round of the
beam. ... REv. STAT. 99 41-53 (1875), 46 U.S.C. § 77 (1964).
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therefore the attempt should not be made. If this assumption is
valid, it can be further contended that the present dissatisfaction
with the personal injury limitation of the Warsaw Convention is
evidence that nothing short of the 100,000-dollar permanent limita-
tion, proposed by the United States as an amendment to the Conven-
tion, should be placed on recovery. It is submitted that the original
purpose of the limitation in admiralty-to encourage the expansion
of commerce and trade-is no longer a practical consideration in
personal injury suits. Commerce and trade have long since reached
an economic level that no amount of personal injury recovery is
likely to discourage.
Given the difficulty of fitting the airplane into this phase of
maritime law, there are aspects of admiralty that could be applied
with ease and benefit to the plaintiff.2 6 For example, the relevance
of contributory" and comparative negligence' doctrines could be
a significant tactical consideration for the personal injury claimant
suing in admiralty. Under the Warsaw Convention, contributory
negligence may be a complete bar to recovery.2" In admiralty, the
doctrine of comparative negligence prevails.8" The fault of the
plaintiff may be used to mitigate damages but not to defeat the
claim entirely.
The prerequisites to federal jurisdiction could be a monumental
reason for bringing suit in admiralty. A trial in federal court,
absent a federal question,8 ' requires that the claimant show diversity
of citizenship and meet the 10,000-dollar amount-in-controversy
26 18 U.S.C. § 7 (1964) has already brought aircraft into maritime
jurisdiction for criminal purposes. It deals with crimes committed over
the high seas and provides:
The term "special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the
United States," as used in this title, includes: ....
(5) Any aircraft belonging in whole or in part to the United
States, or any citizen thereof, or to any corporation created by or
under the laws of the United States, or any State, Territory, district,
or possession thereof, while such aircraft is in flight over the high
seas, or over any other waters within the admiralty and maritimejurisdiction of the United States and out of the jurisdiction of any
particular State.
"For a discussion of contributory negligence see PROSSER, TORTS § 64,
at 426-37 (3d ed. 1964).For a discussion of comparative negligence see id. § 66, at 443-49.
29 Warsaw Convention, art. 21.
'0 Pope & Talbot, Inc. v. Hawn, 346 U.S. 406 (1953).
128 U.S.C. § 1331 (a) (1964) provides that "the district courts shall
have original jurisdiction of all civil actions wherein the matter in contro-
versy exceeds the sum or value of $10,000 exclusive of interest and costs,
and arises under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States."
[Vol. 44
requirement.32 In an admiralty suit, the federal court has jurisdic-
tion in "any civil case of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction"3 " re-
gardless of diversity or amount in controversy.
A possible disadvantage to exclusive admiralty jurisdiction is
that the case will be tried by judge without jury.' But if the claim-
ant desires a jury trial and is able to meet the requirements pre-
viously mentioned for suit in a federal court, the language of the
"saving clause"3 may afford the opportunity. This exception to
maritime jurisdiction preserves a common-law cause of action,
where one exists, to the plaintiff with an in personam 6 claim. It
allows the suit to be brought on the law side of the federal court
(a state court proceeding is also available) with a jury trial even
though the case arises in a maritime context. If this choice is made
the plaintiff must be prepared to meet the diversity and amount-in-
controversy requirements. It was urged by the plaintiff in Romero
v. International Terminal Operating Co.37 that a suit founded in
admiralty, if the claimant chooses the law side of the federal court
by way of the "saving clause," does not require diversity of citizen-
ship as the claim arises under the Constitution and laws of the
United States. Plaintiff, an alien seaman, had a basis for his con-
tention because admiralty jurisdiction is authorized by the Constitu-
tion38 and codified.39 But in a five-to-four decision the Court re-
jected this interpretation. The dissent, led by Justice Brennan,
8228 U.S.C. § 1332(a) (1964).
828 U.S.C. § 1333 (1964).
" RoBINsoN, op, cit. supra note 6, § 1, at 2. It is interesting to note that
not all attorneys consider a jury trial advantageous in litigation involving
aircraft. At the Twenty-first Annual Law Institute of the University of
Tennessee College of Law and the Knoxville Bar Association, Mr. Lee S.
Kreindler, member of the New York Bar, expressed a definite preference
for judge trials. Referring to recent cases in which he was counsel for the
plaintiffs in suits against air lines, he said that it was the defendant air
lines that requested a jury. This was explained in part by the inability of
many jurors to identify with air line passengers as many have yet to fly
and still think that one who "is fool enough to set foot on an airplane is
assuming a very, very serious risk." Trial Tactics in Aviation Litigation,
28 TENN. L. REv. 173, 181-82 (1961).
88 28 U.S.C. § 1333 (1964). It is so designated because it preserves a
common-law cause of action for the plaintiff who qualifies and operates as
an escape valve from the exclusive maritime jurisdiction.
" A claim against the owner of the vessel as opposed to an in rem pro-
ceeding against the vessel itself. A suit to attach a lien on the vessel would
be an example of the latter.
8' 358 U.S. 354 (1959). For a full discussion of the case see BAER,
ADMIRALTY LAW OF THE SUPREME COURT § 1-13, at 62-69 (1963).8 U.S. CoNsT. art III, § 2.
8° 28 U.S.C. § 1873 (1964).
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agreed with the plaintiff that no diversity should be required.
It has been suggested that an acceptance of the minority posi-
tion would be desirous "because there is little logic in a system
of law which affords a seaman suing on a maritime cause of action
a federal jury trial if there happens to be diversity of citizenship
but which denies him a jury in the same federal court if there is
no diversity."4 If this rationale were adopted, it would apply to
passenger claimants as well as seamen and be an additional induce-
ment to seeking maritime jurisdiction.41
The advantages, disadvantages, and problems evidenced in the
previous discussion must be considered in the light of possible de-
parture of the Warsaw Convention from the transoceanic flight
scene in the United States.4" If these rules disappear, admiralty is
a logical replacement.
Some aspects of admiralty, like the tonnage provision,43 would
be difficult to employ. It is submitted that a selective process would
be in order, a new set of rules governing transoceanic air travel
using the basic concepts of admiralty as a foundation with liberal
provision for adjustment to the rapid developments that character-
ize modem aviation.
WILLIAm H. FAULK, JR.
Constitutional Law-Cruel and Unusual Punisbment-
Chronic Alcoholism
In Driver v. Hinnant' defendant had been found guilty and sen-
tenced' to imprisonment for two years for violation of a North
Carolina statute making it a misdemeanor for "any person ... [to]
be found drunk or intoxicated on the public highway, or at any
public place or meeting . . ... - Defendant had been convicted of
,
0 BAER, op. cit. supra note 37, at 69.
"The problem does not arise if the state forum is chosen. But if contrib-
utory negligence is an issue, it may nullify any prospective advantage ofjury trial. In Notarian, contributory negligence was not an issue but this
writer is informed that a three- or four-year backlog in the Pennsylvania
courts played a significant role in the decision to sue in admiralty. Letter
from plaintiff's attorney to the writer, Jan. 31, 1966.
"2 See text accompanying note- 21 supra.
"' See text accompanying note 22 supra.
'Driver v. Hinnant, 34 U.S.L. Week 2422 (4th Cir. Jan. 22, 1966).
2Driver v. Hirmant, 243 F. Supp. 95, 96 (E.D.N.C. 1965).
'N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-335 (1953).
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the same offense over 200 times previously and had spent two-thirds
of his life "on the roads" for drinking.4 He appealed to the North
Carolina Supreme Court contending that his conviction under this
statute was cruel and unusual punishment.5 In a per curiam opinion
the court affirmed the conviction saying that the sentences were
authorized by the statute and that the prison authorities provided
adequate medical treatment for prisoners during their confinement."
The defendant then petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus in the
United States District Court for the Eastern District of North
Carolina.7 The district court denied the writ, holding that the appli-
cation of the statute to the defendant does not subject him to cruel
and unusual punishment.8 On appeal the United States Court of
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit held that the conviction violated the
eighth amendment to the Constitution as being a cruel and unusual
punishment.'
The eighth amendment has been held applicable to the states
through the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment.1 0 It
has been held to prohibit punishment disproportionate to the offense
for which it was imposed" and denationalization for wartime de-
sertion.12 In Robinson v. California"3 the Supreme Court of the
United States held that drug addiction was an illness and a statute
punishing such an illness inflicted cruel and unusual punishment in
' Driver v. Hinnant, 243 F. Supp. 95, 96 (E.D.N.C. 1965).
'State v. Driver, 262 N.C. 92, 136 S.E.2d 208 (1964).
aIbid.
' Driver v. Hinant, 243 F. Supp. 95 (E.D.N.C. 1965).
BId. at 101.
'34 U.S.L. Week 2422 (4th Cir. Jan. 22, 1966).
" In Louisiana ex rel. Francis v. Resweber, 329 U.S. 459, 462-63 (1947),
the Supreme Court assumed without deciding the issue that a violation of
the eighth amendment by a state would violate the due process clause of the
fourteenth amendment. In Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 666 (1962),
the Court specifically decided that the eighth amendment applied to the states
through the due process clause.
" Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349 (1910), where the defendant
made false entries in public records and was sentenced to imprisonment
attended by punishment that included the carrying of chains, deprivation
of civil rights during imprisonment, and thereafter perpetual disqualifica-
tion from holding office.
12 Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86 (1958).
19370 U.S. 660 (1962). For cases in which the Supreme Court has
held that the particular punishment did not violate the eighth amendment
see, e.g., Louisiana ex rel. Francis v. Resweber, 329 U.S. 459 (1947), where
the court denied petitioner's contention that it was cruel and unusual punish-
ment for Louisiana to electrocute him after a prior abortive attempt. Accord,
In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436 (1890) (electrocution).
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violation of the fourteenth amendment.14 In Driver, the court said
that chronic alcoholism is a disease and punishment by criminal
prosecution for those acts on the part of a chronic alcoholic " 'which
are compulsive as symptomatic of the disease'" is a cruel and un-
usual punishment.' Thus the defendant could not be convicted
under a public drunkenness statute, since the symptoms of chronic
alcoholism may appear as a disorder of behavior, and this " 'obvious-
ly... includes appearances in public, as here, unwilled and ungov-
ernable by the victim.' -'s
Although the court did limit its decision to the "'excusal of the
chronic alcoholic from criminal prosecution . . .'" for "'those acts
on his part which are compulsive as symptomatic of the disease,' ,,
the case raises numerous questions with respect to its immediate
application to the public drunkenness statute and its potential appli-
cation to other areas of the law. Perhaps the most immediate prob-
lem inherent in the decision is the determination of the symptoms
of chronic alcoholism. It would seem to be extremely difficult, if
not impossible, for the medical profession, much less the courts,
to make a definitive determination of those acts which are sympto-
matic of the disease.' 8 Consequently, whether or not an act of a
chronic alcoholic is a symptom of his illness will hinge upon the
facts of each case; thus the general limitation imposed by the Fourth
Circuit would seem to be too vague for application in subsequent
cases.
Does it follow from the Driver decision that a chronic alcoholic
cannot be convicted for a crime, other than public drunkenness,
committed while he is intoxicated? The answer to this question
would seem to turn on the question of whether or not a chronic
alcoholic could be classified as insane or whether his drinking had
destroyed his will so that his act was involuntary. Professor Paulsen
has said: "At present psychiatry does not seem to recognize a psy-
chosis which gives rise to an uncontrollable urge to drink although
heavy drinking may be a symptom of a psychosis having other
1 Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 667 (1962).
1 34 U.S.L. Week at 2422.
26 Ibid.
Ibid.18 Comment by Dr. John Ewing, A Panel on Alcoholism and the Law, at
the University of North Carolina School of Law, February 10, 1966.
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related characteristics of disordered behavior and psychic life."' 9
Thus it would seem that chronic alcoholism itself would not be a
defense to a crime other than a violation of a public drunkenness
statute, but that insanity caused by chronic alcoholism would be a
defense.2" In essence, only insanity would be a defense to the crime
and alcoholism would be only a symptom to be admitted into evi-
dence on the question of insanity.
The only other means by which a chronic alcoholic could be
exculpated for a crime committed while he was intoxicated would
be to say that the intoxication destroyed his will.2 ' The Fourth
Circuit said: "'This conclusion does not contravene the familiar
thesis that voluntary drunkenness is no excuse for crime. The
chronic alcoholic has not drunk voluntarily, although undoubtedly
he did so originally. His excess now derives from disease.' "22 The
normal rule is that voluntary intoxication is no excuse for crime23
but that involuntary intoxication may exculpate the accused.2" At
first glance, by saying that the intoxication of the chronic alcoholic
is involuntary, the Fourth Circuit seems to imply that a chronic
alcoholic would be exculpated for any crime he committed while
intoxicated. But it is possible that the court considers the intoxica-
tion of a chronic alcoholic involuntary only in connection with the
violation of a public drunkenness statute. The statute under which
Joe Driver was convicted requires no mens rea25 and voluntary in-
toxication would be no defense to the conviction.26 But, by saying
that the defendant's intoxication was involuntary, the court pro-
1" Paulsen, Intoxication as a Defense to Crime, 1961 U. ILL. L.F. 1, 20.
See generally VI JOINT COMMITTEE ON CONTINUING LEGAL EDUCATION OF
THE AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE AND THE AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION,
THE PROBLEM OF INTOXICATION (1961).
2 Generally, legal insanity brought on by intoxication is a complete de-
fense to a crime. E.g., People v. Herrin, 295 Ill. App. 590, 15 N.E.2d 598
(1938); State v. Painter, 135 W. Va. 106, 63 S.E.2d 86 (1950).
" Involuntary intoxication is a complete defense to a crime if it destroys
the criminal capacity of the defendant's mind. E.g., Choate v. State, 19
Okl. Crim. 169, 197 Pac. 1060 (1921). See generally PERKINS, CRIMINAL
LAW 781, 787 (1957).
22 34 U.S.L. Week at 2422.
" See generally PERKINS, CRIMINAL LAW 787 (1957).
2" See note 21 supra.
2 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-335 (1953). This type of statute provides that
the doing of certain acts is a crime and no mens rea is required.2 For cases illustrating that voluntary intoxication is no defense to a
crime that requires no general mens rea see, e.g., People v. Cochran, 313
Ill. 508, 145 N.E. 207 (1924) (homicide); Walden v. State, 178 Tenn. 71,
156 S.W.2d 385 (1941) (rape).
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vides the defendant with a defense since involuntary intoxication
completely exculpates a defendant from a crime whether or not mens
rea is required. It is doubtful that the court would say that a
chronic alcoholic's intoxication was involuntary if he committed
any crime other than violation of a public drunkenness statute,
since that would mean that no chronic alcoholic could be convicted
for any crime committed while he was intoxicated. 8 A conclusion
such as this would seem to violate the principle purpose of incarcera-
tion-protection of the public from the criminal.2
Although it was conceded in this case that Joe Driver was a
chronic alcoholic,"0 the question arises how the court should deter-
mine who is and who is not a chronic alcoholic. The Fourth Circuit
said, " '[W] hen on arraignment the accused's helplessness comes to
light ... [the Constitution intercedes so that] . . . no criminal con-
viction may follow.' ",' But the court provides no guidance regard-
ing how the determination should be made if it does not appear at
arraignment that the defendant is a chronic alcoholic. One plausible
method of deciding this issue could be found in the District of
Columbia Code where Congress has provided that in any criminal
case in which the evidence indicates that the defendant is a chronic
alcoholic, the judge may suspend the proceedings so that the person
can be confined in a rehabilitation center and treated."2 If the ex-
perts at the rehabilitation center should determine that the accused
is actually a chronic alcoholic, it would seem that the court would
be required to accept this evidence, and no conviction for public
drunkenness could follow.33 Perhaps a better means by which to
determine whether a defendant is a chronic alcoholic would be to
place the burden of proof on the defendant, thereby retaining an
"' See note 21 supra.28 Ibid.
"0 Commonwealth v. Ritter, 13 Pa. D. & C. 285, 291 (Oyer & Terminer
Ct. 1930).
" Driver v. Hinnant, 243 F. Supp. 95, 97 (E.D.N.C. 1965).
8134 U.S.L. Week at 2422.2 Under this statute, the judge may suspend the proceedings and order
a hearing to be held to determine whether the defendant is a chronic
alcoholic. If the judge or jury should find that the defendant is a chronic
alcoholic, he can then be committed to a clinic for diagnosis and treatment
for ninety days. After the ninety-day period has expired, the director of
the clinic can recommend that the defendant be set free conditionally and
under supervision, or be placed in an institution for treatment as a chronic
alcoholic, or be returned to stand trial for the offense charged. D.C. CODE
ANN. §§ 24-504 to -514 (1961).
8 Ibid. This idea seems to be implied in the statute. Cf. Easter v. District
of Columbia, 34 U.S.L. Week 2534 (D.D.C. Mar. 31, 1966).
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independent evaluating function for the judge or jury." Medical
testimony, subject to cross-examination, could be introduced by
either side in the proceedings. Thus, the determination would not
be for the police on arraignment or for the doctors in a rehabilita-
tion center.
If a person is deemed a chronic alcoholic and cannot be con-
victed for violating a public drunkenness statute, the problem arises
what the state can do with him to protect him and the public. In
the Robinson decision the Court speaking of narcotics addicts said:
In the interest of discouraging the violation of such laws, or
in the interest of the general health or welfare of its inhabitants,
a State might establish a program of compulsory treatment for
those addicted to narcotics. Such a program of treatment might
require periods of involuntary confinement. And penal sanction
might be imposed for failure to comply with established com-
pulsory treatment procedures.35
In the Driver case the court said, "'[N]othing we have said pre-
cludes appropriate detention of him for treatment and rehabilitation
so long as he is not marked a criminal.' -a It would seem to follow
that a state could commit a chronic alcoholic to a rehabilitation cen-
ter but could not call him a criminal. This could be accomplished
by means of a civil commitment statute such as is found in North
Carolina.3 7 But, before a state enters upon any program to provide
for chronic alcoholics, the courts must make it clear what type of
confinement would be permitted. THOMAS SIDNEY SMITH
", In a criminal case where the defendant interposes the defense of
intoxication the normal rule is that he has the burden of proof to that fact
and the ultimate issue is for the jury to decide. E.g., State v. Tansimore,
3 N.J. 516, 71 A.2d 169 (1950). Since the court considers chronic alcohol-
ism a disease, it would seem to follow that the rules governing the proof of
insanity could possibly apply to chronic alcoholism. In a trial during which
insanity is brought into issue the burden of proof of insanity is on the
party alleging it. E.g., Handspike v. State, 203 Ga. 115, 45 S.E.2d 662
(1947) ; State v. Creech, 229 N.C. 662, 51 S.E.2d 348 (1949). If the party
asserts insanity that was only temporary, the burden is on him to prove
that he was insane at the time alleged. E.g., Barbour v. State, 262 Ala. 297,
78 So. 2d 328 (1954); State v. Shackleford, 232 N.C. 299, 59 S.E.2d 825
(1950). The existence of insanity is a question to be decided by the jury.
E.g., Wilson v. State, 9 Ga. App. 274, 70 S.E. 1128 (1911) ; State v. Creech,
229 N.C. 662, 51 S.E.2d 348 (1949); State v. Harris, 223 N.C. 697, 28
S.E.2d 232 (1943). See generally 44 C.J.S. Insanity § 7 (1945). For an
excellent bibliography on insanity and the criminal law see TOMPKINS, IN-
SANITY AND TEE CRIMINAL LAW (1960).
" Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 664-65 (1962).
s 34 U.S.L. Week at 2422.
"N.C. GEN. STAT. § 35-2 (Supp. 1965).
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Constitutional Law-Custody Requirement for Federal
Habeas Corpus
Jurisdiction of the federal courts to grant the writ of habeas
corpus is available in five situations.1 An overwhelming number
of habeas corpus petitions are filed pursuant to the requirement that
the petitioner be "in custody in violation of the Constitution or
laws or treaties of the United States."'2 It is evident from the
express wording of the statute and from judicial declaration' that
custody is a jurisdictional prerequisite to the federal courts' power
to hear and determine the constitutional claims presented in a habeas
corpus petition.
The custody requirement is not limited to but can be something
less than incarceration4 and is "something more than moral re-
straint."' Outside the fact of actual incarceration, it has been held
that a person released on parole,' or probation' satisfies the custody
requirement. In Jones v. Cunningham,' the Supreme Court, hold-
ing that a state parolee was "in custody," equated custody with any
significant restraint on a person's liberty "to do those things which
in this country free men are entitled to do." 9 This decision provided
the lower federal courts with a flexible formula to apply in de-
termining whether the extent and character of a particular restraint
on liberty constitutes "custody."
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit,
sitting en banc, recently applied the Jones rationale in Martin v.
Virginia.1" The petitioner escaped while serving a concededly valid
'28 U.S.C. 2241(c) (1964).
2 28 U.S.C. 2241(c) (3) (1964). Habeas corpus petitions filed by state
prisoners in federal district courts increased from 1,903 to 3,531, or 85.5%,
from the 1963 to the 1964 fiscal year. Henry v. Mississippi, 379 U.S. 443,
453 n.8 (1965), citing ANN REP. OF THE DIRECTOR, ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE
OF THE UNITED STATES CoURTs, p. 46 (1964).
:Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 427 n.38 (1963).
'See Jones v. Cunningham, 371 U.S. 236 (1963).
Wales v. Whitney, 114 U.S. 564, 571 (1885).
'Jones v. Cunningham, 371 U.S. 236 (1963).
'Benson v. California, 328 F.2d 159 (9th Cir. 1964). The present
Supreme Court rule is that a person is not in custody who has been released
on bail. Stallings v. Splain, 253 U.S. 339, 343 (1920). There is a split on
this issue in the circuit courts. Compare Bates v. Bates, 141 F.2d 723
(D.C. Cir. 1944), with Rowland v. Arkansas, 179 F.2d 709 (8th Cir. 1950).
8371 U.S. 236 (1963), noted in 51 CALIF. L. REv. 228 (1963), 17
RUTGERS L. REv. 808 (1963), 48 VA. L. REv. 112 (1963).
371 U.S. 236, 243 (1963).
10349 F.2d 781 (4th Cir. 1965).
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fifteen-year sentence for murder. He was subsequently convicted
for escape and grand larceny and sentenced to terms of five and
three years respectively. Petitioner contended that these convictions
were constitutionally defective because he had been denied counsel
of his own choosing and the effective assistance of court-appointed
counsel. According to Virginia law, the latter sentences, in addi-
tion to the valid sentence, were to be considered in computing
petitioner's parole eligibility. As a result of this rule, his parole
eligibility was automatically deferred for three years. Petitioner es-
tablished that the parole board would look with favor upon his
parole application if the latter convictions were set aside. The court
held that the petitioner was "in custody" and therefore entitled to
a hearing on his petition attacking the validity of the sentences to
take effect in the future.
The court expressly rejected the Supreme Court ruling in Mc-
Nally v. Hill," that habeas corpus is not available to attack a future
sentence when the petitioner is serving a valid sentence. It reasoned
that the decisions of Jones v. Cunningham12 and Fay v. Noia 3
provided "reasonable ground for thinking that were the Supreme
Court faced with the issue today, it might well reconsider McNally
and hold that a denial of eligibility for parole is a 'restraint of
liberty' no less substantial than the technical restraint of parole." 4
Martin raises two distinct, but interrelated, questions with re-
spect to the "custody" requirement. First, is the adverse effect of
the second sentence upon the petitioner's parole eligibility a sufficient
restraint upon his liberty to constitute custody? Second, is the attack
on the second conviction premature and hence "moot" in the sense
that the petitioner would still be confined under a valid conviction,
even if the second conviction is set aside?' 5
In McNally, the Court looked to the common law and derived
the rule that a sentence to be served in the future in no way affects
the lawfulness of the detention under a valid first sentence and that
11293 U.S. 131 (1934).
U371 U.S. 236 (1963).
372 U.S. 391 (1963). See Comment, 39 N.Y.U.L. REv. 78 (1964);
Comment, 42 N.C.L. REv. 352 (1964). See generally Bator, Finality in
Criminal and Federal Habeas Corpus for State Prisoners, 76 HRv. L.
REv. 441 (1963); Reitz, Federal Habeas Corpus: Impact of an Abortive
State Proceeding, 74 HARv. L. REv. 1315 (1961).1"349 F.2d at 783-84.
1' See SOKoL, FEDEAL HA EAS CoRPus §§ 5.3, 6 (1965).
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"without restraint which is unlawful, the writ may not be used."10
The McNally test for habeas corpus was one of immediate release
from present physical detention, and, since a successful attack on
the second sentence would not produce this result, habeas corpus
was not available." In Ex Parte Hull,18 the Court carved out an
exception to McNally by permitting attack on a future sentence
that was the sole cause of the petitioner's parole revocation and re-
commitment to prison under a prior valid conviction. The Court
distinguished McNally by reasoning that an immediate declaration
of the invalidity of the second sentence would enable the petitioner
to regain his former parole status, rather than to be subject to
continued incarceration under a valid sentence as in McNally.
The McNally rule is firmly entrenched in federal case law,1'
and as late as 1959 the Supreme Court indicated that it still sub-
scribes to the rule."0 The McNally rule is generally considered a
test of mootness in the sense that an attack on a second sentence is
premature as long as there remains time to be served under a valid
sentence.2
In Martin, it is clear that the court was primarily concerned
with the custody requirement and did not consider the mootness
problem presented by McNally. Relying heavily upon the Jones
rationale, the court reasoned that the "subsequent convictions which
cause the vast difference between continued confinement without
eligibility for consideration for parole and conditional release are in
the truest sense a present restraint upon ... [petitioner's] liberty,
22
and "that a denial of eligibility for parole is a 'restraint of liberty'
no less substantial than the technical restraint of parole."23
16 McNally v. Hill, 293 U.S. 131, 138 (1934).
" The purpose of the proceeding ... [is] to inquire into the legality
of the detention, and the only judicial relief authorized . . . [is] the
discharge of the prisoner or his admission to bail, and that only if
his detention were found to be unlawful.
Id. at 136-37.18 312 U.S. 546 (1941).
"'E.g., Holiday v. Johnston, 313 U.S. 342 (1941); Wilson v. Gray, 345
F.2d 282 (9th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 34 U.S.L. WEEK 3172 (U.S. Nov.
16, 1965); Palumbo v. New Jersey, 334 F.2d 524 (3d Cir. 1964); Osborne
v. Taylor, 328 F.2d 131 (10th Cir. 1964); Holland v. Gladden, 226 F.
Supp. 654 (D. Ore. 1963); United States ex rel. Jackson v. Banmiller, 187
F. Supp. 513 (E.D. Pa. 1960).
20 Heflin v. United States, 358 U.S. 415, 418 (1959).
21 See SoxoL, op. cit. supra note 15, at § 6.




The Martin decision establishes a distinct modification of the
"release from custody" test set out by the Supreme Court in Mc-
Nally. Under the Martin rationale, a successful habeas corpus pro-
ceeding need only result in the petitioner's release from the restraints
on his liberty, and not his immediate release from actual physical
restraint. Conceptually, the restraints in Martin are but one form
of custody, and relief from them necessarily results in a "form of
discharge from custody. "24
The total effect of this form of relief from custody is to render
the petitioner eligible to be considered for parole in the same man-
ner as he would have been had the second sentences not been im-
posed. There is a very strong argument that since parole is a matter
of legislative grace,2 exercised through the sole discretion of state
parole boards,2" the federal district courts should summarily dis-
miss habeas corpus petitions in cases such as Martin because there
is no assurance that the petitioner will be granted parole." Further-
more, the state has a viable interest in the enforcement of its penal
laws and may desire to retry the petitioner. A retrial does not
expose the petitioner to former jeopardy,"s and a valid conviction
effectively diminishes the petitioner's eligibility for parole. Whether
or not a state elects to grant parole or to deny it or to retry the
petitioner would, of course, vary from case to case depending upon
the individual petitioner's record. The court anticipated this prob-
lem and recognized the possibility that future courts might limit
Martin to its facts and require the petitioner to show that he will
be favorably considered for parole. This possibility was negated
2
'Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 427 n.38 (1963).
See Jones v. Rivers, 338 F.2d 862 (4th Cir. 1964), where it was stated
that "freedom, on parole from confinement in a penal institution prior to
serving all of an imposed sentence, is a matter of legislative grace-it is
neither a constitutionally guaranteed nor a God-given right." Id. at 874.
2" The West Virginia statute illustrates this point: "The board of proba-
tion and parole, whenever it shall be of the opinion that the best interests
of the state and the prisoner will be subserved thereby, . . . shall have author-
ity to release any such prisoner on parole for such terms and upon such
conditions as are provided by.... [statute]." W. VA. CODE AxN. § 6291(20)
(1961). (Emphasis added.)
"' The court in Martin assumed that the Virginia Parole Board would
not substantially penalize the petitioner for his escape. But see the VA.
CODE ANN. § 53-227 (1958), which provides that "in case a prisoner at-
tempts to escape or leaves, without permission, the State penitentiary . ..
he shall, upon being recaptured or taken, lose all his accumulated time."
(Emphasis added.)8 United States v. Tateo, 377 U.S. 463 (1964).
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when the court expressly stated that the principle of custody applied
by it to permit attack on a future sentence was not "limited to
one... who is able to state a strong case for parole consideration."2
The decision in Martin appears to be sound on three grounds.
First, Martin's designation of denial of parole eligibility as custody
is but a logical extension of the Jones formula equating parole with
custody. The only difference between the restraints on liberty in
the two cases is one of degree and not substance. In each case the
petitioner has a distinct interest in procuring his release from cus-
tody. Second, a present attack on these convictions appears to be
more practical because it lessens the possibilities that witnesses will
die or move away or that the record of the case will become "cold."
If the McNally rule had been followed in Martin, the second sen-
tences could not have been attacked until they had been imple-
mented." Third, the rationale of Martin is in harmony with the
trend of the Supreme Court's progressive motions 81 as to the scope
and purpose of habeas corpus to protect "individuals against erosion
of their right to be free from wrongful restraints upon their
liberty. 312
It is implicit in the Martin decision that the Fourth Circuit
recognizes the importance of parole, in contrast to continued confine-
ment, as a means of rehabilitating a prisoner, and that the possibility
of his being extended the privilege of parole is a protectable inter-
est of the petitioner who is being denied it because of an invalid
future sentence. Whether the states,"3 in the administration of their
post-conviction procedures, the other circuits, 4 or the Supreme
349 F.2d at 784.8o See SoxoL, op. cit. supra note 15, at § 6.
*' See Sanders v. United States, 373 U.S. 1 (1963); Fay v. Noia, 372
U.S. 391 (1963); Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293 (1963); Jones v.
Cunningham, 371 U.S. 236 (1963).
Jones v. Cunningham, 371 U.S. 236, 243 (1963).8 3The states of New York, Oregon, and Maryland presently permit an
attack on a sentence to be served in the future. 349 F.2d at 784 n.2. It is
reasonable to infer from the very broad language of the North Carolina
post-conviction statute that it is permissible to attack a sentence to be
served in the future. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15-217 (1965). See Note, 44 N.C.L.
IEv. 153 (1965).
" But see Wilson v. Gray, 345 F.2d 282 (9th Cir. 1965), cert. denied,
34 U.S.L. WEEK 3172 (U.S. Nov. 16, 1965), where the petitioner was
denied relief under the McNally and Hull rules. However this case is dis-
tinguishable from Martin in that the immediate invalidation of the second
sentence would not have entitled petitioner to immediate release from in-
carceration, nor would it have rendered him eligible for parole.
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Court follow the lead in Martin is yet to be seen. It is hoped that
neither the technical requirement of McNally that petitioner be re-
leased from physical custody, nor the states' discretionary power to
deny parole or retry petitioner, will be utilized as a jurisdictional
barrier to prevent federal district courts from determining the
validity of sentences to be served in the future.
C. RALPH KINSEY, JR.
Corporations-"Profit Realized" In Section 16(b)-
Insider Transactions
Gamble-Skogmo, Inc., owner of more than ten per cent of the
stock of the plaintiff corporation, bought 32,000 additional shares
for a Gamble-Skogmo employees' trust fund.' Only 25,942 of those
shares were transferred to the fund, however, and the remaining
shares were retained by the purchaser. Within six months of this
purchase, Gamble-Skogmo sold' all of its stock in the plaintiff ex-
cept that held by the trust fund. Plaintiff sought recovery of
Gamble-Skogmo's "profits" on all 32,000 shares under section 16(b)
of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.3 Only the profit made on
the 6,058 retained shares was paid, and plaintiff sued for the prof-
its4 that would have been realized had the 25,942 shares in the
trust fund been included in the short-swing transaction. The district
'Gamble-Skogmo was not required to make its contribution to the trust
fund in Western Auto stock, or in any other stock for that matter. Western
Auto Supply Co. v. Gamble-Skogmo, Inc., 348 F.2d 736, 738 (8th Cir. 1965),
cert. denied, 382 U.S. 987 (1966).
2 The sale was pursuant to an antitrust consent decree. United States
v. Gamble-Skogmo, Inc., Civil No. 12776, W.D. Mo., July 18, 1960.
"48 Stat. 896 (1934), 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1964). See 44 N.C.L. REv.
835 n.3 (1966) for the full text of the statute. See generally 2 Loss, SECURI-
TIES REGULATIONS 1040-90 (2d ed. 1961); Cole, Insiders' Liabilities Under
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 12 Sw. L.J. 147 (1958) ; Cook & Feld-
man, Insider Trading Under the Recurities Exchange Act (pts. 1 & 2), 66
HARv. L. Rv. 385, 612 (1963); Painter, The Evolving Role of Section
16(b), 62 MIcH. L. REv. 649 (1964); Rubin & Feldman, Statutory Inhibi-
tions Upon Unfair Use of Corporate Information by Insiders, 95 U. PA. L.
REv. 468 (1947). At the time their articles were written, Mr. Cook was
Chairman, and Mr. Feldman, Special Council, of the Securities and Ex-
change Commission, though they did not purport to be speaking on behalf
of the Commission.
'The profit was calculated at $3.65 per share, a total of $116,800.00,
based on the difference between the price per share paid for the 32,000
shares and the price per share received when all 1,262,102 shares were sold.
Also, two dividends of $.35 per share, paid on the stock before the short-
swing sale, were included,
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court held in favor of the defendant,5 but in Western Aueto Supply
Co. v. Gamble-Skogmo, Inc.' the United States Court of Appeals
for the Eighth Circuit reversed, holding that the plaintiff should
recover profits, realized or not, on all 32,000 shares.
Under section 16 (b) liability is based upon an objective measure
of proof.7 A plaintiff need only show that the "insider"' traded in
his company's stock within a six-month period. A showing of ac-
tual unfair use of inside information is not necessary,9 and the good
faith or intention motivating the insider's trading is irrelevant. 10
Since the statute does not prohibit insider trading,1 it is meant
to be broadly construed by the courts so as to have a prophylactic
effect. 2 At the same time, section 16(b) makes an insider liable
only for "any profit realized"'- by him on his short-swing transac-
tions. However, neither "profit" nor "realized" is defined in the
statute or in the rules issued by the Securities and Exchange Com-
mission. Since in the ordinary violation the "profit realized" is
simply the difference between the sale price and the purchase price,
'Western Auto Supply Co. v. Gamble-Skogmo, Inc., 231 F. Supp. 456
(D. Minn. 1964).
'348 F.2d 736 (8th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 987 (1966).
This was a two-to-one decision.
Smolowe v. Delendo Corp., 136 F.2d 231, 235 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
320 U.S. 751 (1943).
'An "insider" is a director, officer, or a stockholder owning 109 or
more of the stock of the corporation. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934,
§ 16(a), 48 Stat. 896 (1934), 15 U.S.C. § 78p(a) (1964).
'It has been suggested that the preamble of § 16(b), which refers to
this, was intended merely as an aid to constitutionality and a guide to the
SEC in the exercise of its rule-making authority. Smolowe v. Delendo
Corp., 136 F.2d 231, 236 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 320 U.S. 751 (1943).
However, while actual motive is irrelevant, the absence of any possibility of
improper motive has sometimes been considered relevant by the courts in
determining whether a conversion or reclassification of securities involved
a "purchase" or "sale." 2 Loss, op. cit. supra note 3, at 1041 n.14.
"0 Blau v. Max Factor & Co., 342 F.2d 304, 307 (9th Cir.), cert denied,
382 U.S. 892 (1965); B. T. Babbitt, Inc. v. Lachner, 332 F.2d 255, 257 (2d
Cir. 1964); Rheem Mfg. Co. v. Rheem, 295 F.2d 473, 475 (9th Cir. 1961);
Blau v. Lehman, 286 F.2d 786, 791 (2d Cir. 1960), aff'd, 368 U.S. 403(1962) ; Walet v. Jefferson Lake Sulphur Co., 202 F.2d 433, 434 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 346 U.S. 820 (1953); Gratz v. Claughton, 187 F.2d 46, 51 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 341 U.S. 920 (1951); Smolowe v. Delendo Corp., supra
note 9, at 235.
" As originally drafted, § 16(b) was to have been a complete prohibi-
tion against any insider trading, and criminal penalties were to attach to
any of its violations. Hearings Before Senate Committee on Banking and
Currency on S. Res. 84, 56, and 97, 73d Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 15, at 6430
(1934).
" Blau v. Lehman, 368 U.S. 403, 414 (1962).
1848 Stat. 896 (1934), 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1964).
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only one court 4 has had occasion thus far to consider what should
be the definition of "any profit realized":
[W]e think it is clear that Congress intended that ordinarily
no gain in the value of securities should be deemed to be realized
as a profit under the Act until there had been a definitive act by
the owner of the securities whereby the paper value of the securi-
ties has become a real and includible one .... 15
In Gamble-Skogmo there was likewise only a paper profit made
on the 25,942 trust fund shares. Consequently it would seem that
the court should have affirmed the decision that only the profit
admittedly made on the 6,058 shares was recoverable. While those
shares were purchased at the same time as the others, they were
never transferred to the fund. Instead, they were retained by
Gamble-Skogmo and sold along with its earlier-acquired stock less
than six months later at a higher price. Although it is not clear in
either the opinions or the briefs what the exact relationship of the
trust fund to the corporation was, two arguments support the posi-
tion of this note that no recoverable profit was made on the 25,942
shares.
The Eighth Circuit apparently felt that the trust fund was not
enough a separate entity for the corporation to have lost any real
control over the shares of stock transferred to the fund. 6 There-
fore, it reasoned that because Gamble-Skogmo within a six-month
period had purchased a certain number of shares at one price and
had sold an equivalent number of shares at a higher price when it
disposed of its entire holding, a recoverable profit could be imputed
1, Heli-Coil Corp. v. Webster, 352 F.2d 156 (3d Cir. 1965), 44 N.C.L.
REv. 835 (1966). The term "any profit realized" has been considered
indirectly, however, in two cases dealing with an investment banking house's
partners who were sitting on the board of directors of the issuing corpora-
tions at the time of the partnership's short-swing transactions. In Rattner
v. Lehman, 193 F.2d 564 (2d Cir. 1952), the court concluded that the partner
was liable only for his distributive share of the profits since "under a
literal reading of the statute he cannot be held liable for profits 'realized'
by other partners from the firm's short swing transactions." 193 F.2d at
565. In Blau v. Lehman, 368 U.S. 403 (1962), the only Supreme Court
case interpreting § 16(b), the Court reached a similar conclusion based on
Rattizer.
1 352 F.2d at 167. This definition has been quoted subsequently in
Brief for the SEC as Amicus Curiae, p. 19, in Blan v. Lamb, 242 F. Supp.
151 (S.D.N.Y. 1965), now on appeal before the Second Circuit.
'o The court of appeals, contrary to the district court, held that dividends
received on the 25,942 shares in the trust fund were recoverable by plaintiff.
348 F.2d at 744. This might lend strength to the implication that the court of
appeals felt that the trust fund was indistinguishable from the corporation.
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to the 25,942 shares. The court said that section 16(b) required
that purchases and sales be matched arbitrarily so as to disgorge
the insider of his maximum profit, regardless of the insider's intent
or the time when the stock was purchased.' 7 This was based on the
widely accepted rule of the leading case of Smolowe v. Delendo
Corp.'8 There the insiders argued that the sales of the shares in-
volved were made from a backlog of stock they had kept longer
than six months. Stressing that the object of the statute was "to
squeeze all possible profits out of stock transactions,"'" the court
rejected the insiders' argument 0 that they be allowed to match
stock certificates and held that the only rule whereby all possible
profits could surely be recovered was that of "lowest price in, high-
est price out" within six months.2'
Although the corporation in effect sought to match certificates
in opposition to the Smolowe rule, the facts of Gamble-Skogmno
seem sufficiently distinguishable to warrant segregation of shares.
Had Smolowe permitted matching of certificates, the insiders would
have retained measurable profits in violation of the spirit if not the
letter of section -16(b). Such a holding would also violate the con-
cept of shares as fungibles.22 Unlike the insiders in Smolowe,
Gamble-Skogmo's earlier acquired interest in the plaintiff was not
being used as a backlog of stock to evade the statute by speculating
in plaintiff's stock. Since the Sinolowe rule contemplates an arbi-
348 F.2d at 743.
18 136 F.2d 231 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 320 U.S. 751 (1943).
1d. at 239.
20 The insiders argued for the "identity of shares" theory or its corollary,
the "first-in, first-out" rule, both borrowed from the tax field. See Treas.
Reg. § 1.1012-1 (c) (1958), as amended, T.D. 6837, 1965 INT. REv. BULL.
No. 31, at 13. They also argued for the striking of an average purchase
and sale price, but the court rejected that argument, too, because allowing
losses to offset profits would encourage more, not less, insider trading. 136
F.2d at 239. The harshness of the lowest-price-in, highest-price-out rule may
be seen by Gratz v. Claughton, 187 F.2d 46 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 341
U.S. 920 (1951), which reasserted the Svnolowe doctrine after an indepen-
dent analysis. There the court assessed a judgment of $300,000 against the
defendant for his insider "profits," although his trading in the stock had
resulted in an actual loss of over $400,000.
21 The lowest-price-in, highest-price-out test had been specifically included
in the original drafts of § 16(b) and deleted without explanation. S. 2693
and H.R. 7852, § 15(b) (1), 73d Cong., 2d Sess. (1934). For an explana-
tion of the way in which the test is meant to be applied, see 2 Loss, op. cit.
supra note 3, at 1062-66.




trary matching of purchases and sales, it should not be blindly ap-
plied in every case. To apply it here would be to penalize Gamble-
Skogmo for a profit as yet unrealized. Until such time as the 25,942
shares in the trust fund are sold, their appreciation, as measured by
the difference between what Gamble-Skogmo paid for the stock and
what it received from the sale of its other stock, is merely a paper
profit. Section 16(b) neither prevents an insider from investing
in his company's stock nor penalizes him for using inside informa-
tion to speculate if the trading is done at six-month intervals.
Furthermore, the court's fear that the policy of section 16(b)
would be frustrated by permitting Gamble-Skogmo's defense of
segregating shares appears groundless. The statute has not been
applied as arbitrarily as the language of the opinions might sug-
gest.23 For example, conflicting results2" in applying the term "pur-
chase and sale"' to various transactions indicate that most of those
decisions have been rendered on an ad hoc basis. It has been said
that while not doing violence to the supposedly "objective" thrust
of the statute, the courts have inferred that Congress did not intend
the application of section 16(b) to be purely mechanical and auto-
matic in every respect.2"
The district court, on the other hand, apparently felt that the
trust fund was distinct from the corporation.1 Thus, at the time
Gamble-Skogmo sold all of its interest in the plaintiff, it had no claim
to the 25,942 shares, which had already passed into the assets of the
trust fund some five months earlier. This would be a distinguishing
"See, e.g., Blau v. Max Factor & Co., 342 F.2d 304 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 382 U.S. 892 (1965); Ferraiolo v. Newman, 259 F.2d 342 (6th Cir.
1958), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 927 (1959).
2 Compare Walet v. Jefferson Lake Sulphur Co., 202 F.2d 433 (5th
Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 820 (1953) (exercise of stock options a "pur-
chase"); Park & Tilford, Inc. v. Schulte, 160 F.2d 984 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 332 U.S. 761 (1947) (conversion of preferred stock into common
a "purchase"); Marquette Cement Mfg. Co. v. Andreas, 239 F. Supp.
962 (S.D.N.Y. 1965) (receipt of stock pursuant to corporate liquidation a
"purchase"), with Roberts v. Eaton, 212 F.2d 82 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 348
U.S. 827 (1954) (receipt of stock in reclassification not a "purchase");
Blau v. Ogsbury, 210 F.2d 426 (2d Cir. 1954) (acquisition of stock under
option contract not a "purchase"); Shaw v. Dreyfus, 172 F.2d 140 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 337 U.S. 907 (1949) (receipt of rights distributed to
all stockholders proportionately not a "purchase").2r48 Stat. 896 (1934), 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1964).2 Painter, supra note 3, at 665.
231 F. Supp. at 461. Letter From Edward J. Callahan, Jr., Counsel
for Gamble-Skogmo, Inc., to the writer, April 12, 1966, on file with the
North Carolina Law Review, states that the trust fund "was a wholly separate
entity... and no one at Gamble-Skogmo had any position with it nor control
over it."
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feature from the Smolowe-type cases28 where the insiders still held
other stock of the issuer but argued that those shares were of stock
acquired more than six months before the sale in question. The
"undeniable fact"2 to the district court was that there was no "pur-
chase" of the stock on Gamble-Skogmo's part. Rather, the corpora-
tion had acted simply as a "conduit" through which the shares
destined for the trust fund passed." Accordingly, this transfer of
stock was not a short-swing transaction. Furthermore, since Gam-
ble-Skogmo delivered the stock to the trust fund at the same price it
paid for it,31 no profit inured to Gamble-Skogmo on the transfer
and the whole transaction was the same as if Gamble-Skogmo had
made a voluntary gift of the stock to the fund.8"
While the district court was obviously trying to avoid the "pur-
poseless harshness"' 3 of section 16(b), it would have been more
" See, e.g., Walet v. Jefferson Lake Sulphur Co., 202 F.2d 433 (5th
Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 820 (1953); Gratz v. Claughton, 187 F.2d 46
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 341 U.S. 920 (1951); Blau v. Allen, 163 F. Supp.
702 (S.D.N.Y. 1958).
" 231 F. Supp. at 461.
" Ibid. The district court's argument was accepted by the dissentingjudge in the court of appeals. 348 F.2d at 745 (dissenting opinion). Al-
though the SEC argued that the district court's conclusion that Gamble-
Skogmo acted as a "conduit" for the purpose of making the purchase for
the trust fund "appears to be without support," it conceded that if Gamble-
Skogmo had acted "solely as agent for the trust fund, the trial court's result
might have been reached without endangering the principles which we feel
must not be impaired." Brief for the SEC as Amicus Curiae, p. 13 n.16,
Western Auto Supply Co. v. Gamble-Skogmo, Inc., 348 F.2d 736 (8th Cir.
1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 987 (1966). But, quaere whether the abuse
of inside information would be any the less in one situation than in the other.
1 Had Gamble-Skogmo actually sold the 25,942 shares on the market
on the day of the transfer, it would have sustained a loss of $.60 per share.
Wall Street Journal, Jan. 29, 1960, p. 18, col. 6.
" Compare the two so-called "gift" cases cited by the district court,
Shaw v. Dreyfus, 172 F.2d 140 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 337 U.S. 907 (1949),
and Truncale v. Blumberg, 80 F. Supp. 387 (S.D.N.Y. 1948), where it
was held that the making of gifts of warrants or the shares purchased on
exercise of the warrants was no violation of § 16(b). The reasoning in
both cases was placed on the ground that no profit had been realized by the
insiders. In Truncale the SEC in its amicus curiae brief specifically argued
for the theory that there had beer no "profit realized" by the insider, rather
than that there had been no "sale." 80 F. Supp. at 391. But, quaere whether
the making of a gift of appreciated securities is not an economic benefit
equal to a profit to the insider, either in terms of taxes, prestige in the
community, or recompense for personal services. See Shaw v. Dreyfus,
supra at 143 (dissenting opinion by Clark, J.). The court of appeals in
Gamble-Skognto sought to distinguish these two cases on the basis that they
both dealt with bona fide gifts and that neither involved a sale within six
months of the gift. 348 F.2d at 743 n.7.3 Blau v. Max Factor & Co., 342 F.2d 304, 307 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,
382 U.S. 892 (1965).
[Vol. 44
INSIDER TRANSACTIONS
reasonable if the court had held that the acquisition and transfer
of the 25,942 shares were a "purchase" and "sale" by Gamble-
Skogmo which resulted in a technical violation of the statute.3 4 But,
since no profit was realized on the transaction, there was nothing
the plaintiff could recover. Again, the only recoverable profit would
be on the 6,058 shares that were retained by Gamble-Skogmo and
later sold.
It is unfortunate that both of the courts in Gamble-Skogmo
failed to express clearly their concept of the trust fund's relation-
ship to the corporation. Nevertheless, whether the trust fund be
considered separate from or part of the corporation, there seemingly
was no "profit realized" by Gamble-Skogmo on the 25,942 trust
fund shares. Therefore, it is submitted that a correct application
of the statute in this case should have allowed plaintiff to recover
only the profit made on the 6,058 shares actually involved in the
short-swing transaction.
F. LEE LIEBOLT, JR.*
Corporations-Section 16(b) Liability-Conversion
Transactions by Insiders
In Heli-Coil Corp. v. Webster,' the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Third Circuit has taken a novel approach to certain
questions concerning liability under the Securities Exchange Act of
1934.2 Defendant Webster, a director of Heli-Coil Corporation,
purchased a quantity of the corporation's callable debentures, which
were convertible into common stock any time before redemption or
maturity. Within six months of the purchase of the debentures,
Webster converted, exchanging the- bonds for 3,600 shares of com-
mon stock, and within .six months of conversion, he sold 1,300
shares of the Heli-Coil common. There had been no call oh the
debentures. The corporation brought suit to -recover short-swing
profits under the provisions of section 16(b) of the Securities Ex-
change Act.3 The district court held that the conversion of the
'Cf. Heli-Coil Corp. v. Webster, 352 F.2d 156 (3d Cir. 1965).
* Student at the University of North Carolina School of Law.
'352 F.2d 156 (3d Cir. 1965).
248 Stat. 881 (1934), 15 U.S.C. § 78 (1964).
8 (b) For the purpose of preventing the unfair use of information
which may have been obtained by such beneficial owner, director, or
19661
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debentures into common stock was a "purchase" of the common
and a "sale" of the debentures within the meaning of section 16(b) 4
and decided that Webster was therefore liable for profits derived
from the "sale" of the bonds within six months of their "purchase,"
and for profits from the "sale" of the common within six months
after it was "purchased" in the conversion transaction. An award
of 116,544.36 dollars was rendered in favor of the corporation.
The court of appeals affirmed the finding of the lower court, but
decided that Webster had realized no "profit" within the meaning
of section 16(b) from the "sale" of the debentures and reduced
the judgment to 45,144.36 dollars, representing the profits from the
"sale" of the common stock only.
Section 16(b) of the act provides for recovery by a corporation
of any profits realized by an "insider" of the corporation if its
securities are listed on a national exchange or traded over-the-
counter and it has a total of 750 or 500 shareholders, depending
upon the date, and assets of at least 1,000,000 dollars.5 An "insider"
is any officer, director, or ten per cent beneficial owner of any class
of securities of the corporation.6 Enforcement of this provision is
aided by section 16(a), which requires that insiders of such corpo-
rations file reports as to their holdings and transactions in any of
officer by reason of his relationship to the issuer, any profit realized
by him from any purchase and sale, or any sale and purchase, of
any equity security of such issuer (other than an exempted security)
within any period of less than six months, unless such securit was
acquired in good faith in connection with a debt previously contracted,
shall inure to and be recoverable by the issuer, irrespective of any
intention on the part of such beneficial owner, director, or officer in
intering into such transaction of holding the security purchased or of
not repurchasing the security sold for a period exceeding six months.
Suit to recover such profit may be instituted at law or in equity in any
court of competent jurisdiction by the issuer, or by the owner of any
security of the issuer in the name and in behalf of the issuer if the
issuer shall fail or refuse to bring such suit within sixty days after
request or shall fail diligently to prosecute the same thereafter; but no
such suit shall be brought more than two years after the date such
profit was realized. This subsection shall not be construed to cover
any transaction where such beneficial owner was not such both at the
time of the purchase and sale, or the sale and purchase, of the security
involved, or any transaction or transactions which the Commission
by rules and regulations may exempt as not comprehended within the
purpose of this subsection.
48 Stat. 896 (1934), 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1964).
'Heli-Coil Corp. v. Webster, 222 F. Supp. 831 (D.N.J. 1963).
78 Stat. 565, 15 U.S.C. § 781 (1964).
a See note 7 infra.
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the corporation's equity securities.' The act was designed to in-
sure to the public the maintenance of fair and honest markets in
securities.' Section 16(b) itself was prompted by many abusive
practices of corporate insiders in securities transactions prior to
1934."
In its application, section 16(b) is meant to impose an objec-
tive, strict liability, requiring no proof of actual use of inside in-
formation.' The fact that the person comes under the definition of
"insider" is sufficient." This requirement is needed in order that
the provision be effective, because of practical difficulties in proving
use of such information. The strict wording of the statute not-
withstanding, there is allowance for some administrative flexibility
in that the Securities and Exchange Commission is given the power
to make rules exempting from the section types of transactions that
it believes were not comprehended to be within its purview. 12 The
(a) Every person who is directly or indirectly the beneficial owner of
more than 10 per centum of any class of any equity security (other
than an exempted security) which is registered pursuant to section
781 of this title, or who is a director or an officer of the issuer of
such security, shall file, at the time of the registration of such
security on a national securities exchange or by the effective date
of a registration statement filed pursuant to section 781(g) of this
title, or within ten days after he becomes such beneficial owner, direc-
tor, or officer, a statement with the Commission (and, if such security
is registered on a national securities exchange, also with the ex-
change) of the amount of all equity securities of such issuer of which
he is the beneficial owner, and within ten days after the close of each
calendar month thereafter, if there has been a change in such owner-
ship during such month, shall file with the Commission (and if such
security is registered on a national securities exchange, shall also file
with the exchange), a statement indicating his ownership at the close
of the calendar month and such changes in his ownership as have
occurred during such calendar month.
48 Stat. 896 (1934), 15 U.S.C. § 78p(a) (1964).
' Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 48 Stat. 881, 15 U.S.C. § 78b (1964).
'Among thesi were situations in which insiders with advance knowledge
of facts that would depress the market price sold their stock at then current
prices and repurchased when publication of the information had the antici-
pated effect, and situations in which insiders with advance knowledge would
buy stock and sell after an anticipated subsequent rise in prices. See Smolowe
v. Delendo Corp., 136 F.2d 231,-cert. denied, 320 U.S. 751 (1943); S..R x.
No. 792, 73d Cong.; 2d Sess. 9 (1934).
" "[W]e are of the opinion ... that it was the intention of Congress
in enacting § 16(b) to obviate any necessity for a search of motives of
the insider or require an investigation of whether or not his actions were
animated by inside information to gain a speculative profit." Heli-Coil Corp.
v. Webster, 352 F.2d 156, 165 (3d Cir. 1965).
"1 See Blau v. Lehman, 286 F.2d 786 (2d Cir. 1960), aff'd, 368 U.S.
403 (1962).
1" See note 3 supra.
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Commission has thus become the "watchdog" of section 16(b), by
acting in this statutory capacity to prevent harsh liabilities.18
Under section 16(b), there must be a "purchase and sale," or
"sale and purchase," and "profit realized" within the definition of
the act. 4 The question whether conversion of a convertible security
fits into these requirements is the problem in Heli-Coil and will be
the concern of this note.
The act defines "purchase" as any "contract to buy, purchase,
.or otherwise acquire,"' 5 and "sale" as "any contract to sell or other-
wise dispose of."' 6 Thus under section 16(b) the two terms are
given broader definitions than those usually understood.'1 Some
courts,' 8 relying on Park & Tilford, Inc. v. Schulte,"0 one of the
two leading decisions in the area, have decided that conversion of
a convertible security into common stock is a "purchase" of that
stock under section 16(b). In Park & Tilford, the defendants were
beneficial owners of over ten per cent of the common stock of the
corporation and of a large block of convertible preferred shares.
The corporation gave notice of a redemption of the preferred, and
the defendants then converted their preferred into common and sold
at a profit within six months. The court found the conversion a
"purchase" of the common and held the defendants liable for the
profits of the subsequent "sale," reasoning that if conversion was
not deemed a "purchase," it would put the defendant in a position
to abuse any possession of inside information. The court had no
difficulty with the fact that there was a call on the preferred shares,
because the defendants had sufficient voting power to control the
call.
The second of the leading decisions on this question is Ferraiolo
v. Newman."0 Here the defendant director owned convertible pre-
"In the administration of § 16(b) the Securities and Exchange Com-
mission has adopted twenty rules exempting various transactions in whole
or in part from its provisions. Rules 16a-1 to -10, 17 C.F.R. § 240.16a-1
to -10 (1964); and rules 16b-1 to -10, 17 C.F.R. § 240.16b-1 to -10 (1964).
x, See note 3 supra.
1 Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 48 Stat. 882, 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a) (13)
(1964).
1" Securities E change Act of 1934, 48 Stat. 882, 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a) (14)(1964).
17 See Blau v. Lamb, 163 F. Supp. 528 (S.D.N.Y. 1958).
E.g., Heli-Coil Corp. v. Webster, 352 F.2d 156 (3d Cir. 1965); Blau
v. Lamb, supra note 17.
"' 160 F.2d 984 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 332 U.S. 761 (1947).
20259 F,2d 342 (6th Cir, 1958), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 927 (1959).
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ferred shares of the corporation, and a call was issued at a redemp-
tion price less than market price. To avoid loss, defendant con-
verted the preferred to common and sold the common within six
months. The court did not follow Park & Tilford but held instead
that the preferred and common were substantial economic equiva-
lents and that the conversion was in reality forced because defen-
dant played no part in the call and had no power to control it. The
transaction was found to be "not one that could have lent itself to
the practices which section 16(b) was enacted to prevent."2 1
Ferraiolo has been criticized as advocating a subjective approach
to liability under section 16(b) by requiring examination of the
actual circumstances behind the conversion. 2 On the other hand,
Park & Tilford has been favored as representing the objective ap-
proach to section 16(b)3 by imposing liability as a rule of thumb
if the transaction is of a type open to insider abuse by use of
special information. As pointed out, the act itself requires an ob-
jective approach to liability. To take a subjective view would be
to compromise the statute and hamper full realization of its pur-
poses. Admittedly, there must be a policy determination made here,
for an entirely objective approach will of necessity cause hardship
when, as in Ferraiolo, there is a forced conversion. This hardship
must, however, be weighed against the value of fully implementing
the statute itself. When this consideration is viewed in conjunction
with the power of the Commission to make exemptions from the
section, the objective view seems to be correct.
The district court determined that Heli-Coil should be governed
by Park & Tilford.2 The defendant contended the case was
analogous to Ferraiolo, arguing that there was no "purchase" of
the common because the convertible and the common shares were
substantial equivalents.' The court rejected this, seeing the dis-
tinction between Park & Tilford and Ferraiolo as the involuntary
nature of the conversion in the latter case, and held the conversion a
"purchase" of the common and, in addition, a "sale" of the con-
2"259 F.2d at 346.
" Heli-Coil Corp. v. Webster, 352 F.2d 156, 164 (3d Cir. 1965) ; Petteys
v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 246 F. Supp. 526, 529 (D. Minn. 1965). But
see Blau v. Max Factor & Co., 342 F.2d 304 (9th Cir. 1965).
"Ibid.
2, Heli-Coil Corp. v. Webster, 222 F. Supp. 831 (D.N.J. 1963).
"222 F. Supp. at 835.
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vertible, purchased less than six months previously. This was the
first time a court had considered the conversion also to have been
a "sale," and, though the idea was not mentioned in Park & Til-
ford, the Heli-Coil court had no trouble basing its decision on that
case. It recognized that Park & Tilford had not actually dealt with
this new question, but decided that its ratio decidendi would de-
termine that issue.2"
The ramifications of such a decision are apparent. By treating
the paper profits on conversion as actual realized profits, the court
subjects the insider to liability for two sets of "purchases" and
"sales" rather than the customary one, thereby compelling the defen-
dant to account for a far greater amount than he actually realized."
Thus, in Heli-Coil his liability was almost doubled-a harsh result
adding an element of punishment to the usual liability under sec-
tion 16(b). Sustaining this result would contravene the statute's
remedial purpose29 as much as adherence to the subjective standard
suggested in Ferraiolo. This was the position of the Securities
Exchange Commission when the lower court decision in Heli-Coil
was rendered. In the court of appeals, the Commission, appearing as
amicus curiae, asserted that section 16(b), literally construed, meant
that conversion is both a "purchase" of the common shares and a
"sale" of the convertible shares,"° but introduced a "substantial and
novel" 31 concept, arguing that defendant did not "realize" any profits
in the "sale" at conversion . 2 It pointed out that the district court
had not considered this issue and said that the words "profit real-
ized" in the act mean a great deal more than mere paper profits, and
neither words used nor the statutory purpose calls for a finding
that a profit was "realized" upon the conversion of the debentures
under the circumstances of this case. When used with reference to
investments, the term "realized" generally refers to the liquida-
tion of an investment position and the collection of whatever
profit has accrued. Although in some situations the statutory
purpose may require a broader concept, this is not such a case.
21 Ibid.
222 F. Supp. at 834.
2 For a discussion of the tremendous losses this can cause the defendant,
see 19 RUTGERS L. REv. 151, 152 (1964).
2 See Ellerin v. Massachusetts Mut. Life Ins. Co., 270 F.2d 259 (2d
Cir. 1959); Adler v. Klawans, 267 F.2d 840 (2d Cir. 1959).
"Brief for the SEC as Amicus Curiae, pp. 8-13, Heli-Coil Corp. v.




In no real sense did Mr. Webster [the insider] liquidate his posi-
tion or collect a profit when he converted .... After the con-
version, as before . .. [he] retained his investment position in
the securities of Heli-Coil and whatever profits had accrued con-
tinued to be at the risk of the market and could disappear without
"realization" if the market price of the common were to decline
substantially. In the parlance of investors, these profits continued
to be "paper" profits both before and after the conversion.
3
The court of appeals, adopting the Commission's position, said:
Measuring the terms "profit" and "realize!' in conjunction, we
think it is clear that Congress intended that ordinarily no gain
in the value of securities should be deemed to be realized as a
profit under the Act until there has been a definitive act by the
owner of the securities whereby the paper value of the securi-
ties has become a real and an includible one-in the case at bar,
by a sale of the common stock by Webster for cash.
4
Accordingly, Webster's liability was reduced to the actual profit
"realized," this being the difference between the value of the com-
mon at conversion, and its subsequent sales price.
Practically the same issue as that presented in Heli-Coil has
arisen in Blau v. Lamb,-5 a case now on appeal to the Second Cir-
cuit. There the defendants acquired convertible preferred shares,
within six months converted into common, and then sold the com-
mon within six months. The court below held that the transaction
constituted a "purchase" of the common, and a "sale' of the con-
vertible preferred. 36 The Securities and Exchange Commission, as
amicus curiae, cited Heli-Coil and took the same position it had
taken there, saying that
the court below correctly held that the voluntary conversion of
preferred stock into common stock constituted a "sale" of the
preferred and a "purchase" of the common .... However, that
... under the circumstances of this case, no profit was realized
by Appellants from the disposition of the preferred stock upon
conversion.37
It will not be surprising if the Second Circuit in Blau v. Lamb
follows the "no profit realized" position of the Commission as did
"Id at 14, 15.
"Heli-Coil Corp. v. Webster, 352 F.2d 156, 167-68 (3d Cir. 1965).85242 F. Supp 151 (S.D.N.Y. 1965).
"Ibid.
'7 Brief for the SEC as Amicus Curiae, p. 5, Blau v. Lamb, 242 F. Supp.
151 (S.D.N.Y. 1965).
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the Third Circuit in Heli-Coil. This would be only proper in view
of the closeness of the Commission to such transactions and its
statutory power as "watchdog" over section 16(b). 8s The approach
in Heli-Coil is a novel one; however, convincing as it may be, it is
difficult to avoid the impression that it is actually no more than a
stopgap-giving the courts an opportunity to impose a reasonable
liability in accordance with the purpose of section 16(b) while allow-
ing the Commission a chance to formulate and express its own
policy by adopting rules of exemption. This impression is strength-
ened by the fact that the Commission recently has passed an amend-
ment to its rule 16b-98" that will apparently remedy the problems
discussed here. Previously, rule 16b-9 allowed an exemption from
16(b), under certain circumstances, for acquisitions and disposi-
tions of securities in the conversion of one class of security into
another class that has similar characteristics.40 The amendment ex-
tends the exemption to
conversion of an equity security convertible into any class of
equity security of the same issuer; provided that, no more than
15 per cent of the value of the security received at the time of
conversion is received or paid, in cash or other property (other
than the convertible security given in exchange), in connection
with the conversion. 41
This rule will apparently cause the six month short-swing
period to be measured from the time of "purchase" of the converti-
ble security, to the time of the "sale" of the "security as to which
the conversion privilege relates," 41 and will allow profits realized
"8 See notes 3 and 13 supra.
"9 See note 42 infra.40 Rule 16b-9, 17 C.F.R. 240.16b-9 (1964).
"' Notice of Proposal to Amend Rule 16b-8 and Rule 16b-9 Under the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, SEC Release, No. 7750, Nov. 27, 30 Fed.
Reg. 14742 (1965).
"The full text of the rule as amended by SEC Release, No. 7826, Feb.
17, 31 Fed. Reg. - (1966): § 240.16b-9 Exemption from section 16(b)
of transactions involving the conversion of equity securities.
(a) Any acquisition or disposition of an equity security involved
in the conversion of an equity security; which, by its terms or pur-
suant to the terms of the corporate charter or other governing. instru-
ments, is convertible immediately or after a stated period of time into
another equity security of the same issuer, shall be exempt from the
operation of Section 16(b) of the Act; Provided, however, That this
rule shall not apply to the extent that there shall have been either (i) a
purchase of any equity security of the class convertible (including any
equity security of the class issuable upon conversion, or (ii) a sale
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from any such sale or purchase transactions to be recovered by the
corporation. Its impact in cases such as Heli-Coil or Blau v. Lamb
is obvious, for in either situation it possibly would have relieved
the defendant of all liability under secton 16(b)."
Thus, by the amendment, the Securities and Exchange Commis-
sion has acted as quickly as could be expected to remedy an un-
fortunate development under section 16(b) of the Securities Ex-
change Act of 1934. The new rule will terminate any questions
on the propriety of the Heli-Coil decision. 4
JOHN R. JOLLY, JR.
of any equity security of the class convertible and any purchase of
any equity security issuable upon conversion, (otherwise than in a
transaction involved in such conversion or in a transaction exempted
by any other rule under Section 16(b) within a period of less than
six months which includes the date of conversion.
(b) For the purpose of this rule, an equity security shall not be
deemed to be acquired or disposed of upon conversion of an equity
security if the terms of the equity security converted require the pay-
ment or entail the receipt, in connection with such conversion, of
cash or other property (other than equity securities involved in the
conversion) equal in value at the time of conversion to more than
15% of the value of the equity security issued upon conversion.
(c) For the purpose of this rule, an equity security shall be
deemed convertible if it is convertible at the option of the holder or
of some other person or by operation of the terms of the security
or the governing instruments.
I8lbid.
"In relation to the amendment, the Commission has moved for leave
to file as amicus curiae in the case of Petteys v. Northwest Airlines, Inc.,
246 F. Supp. 526 (D. Minn. 1965), now on appeal to the Eighth Circuit.
This case presents a situation different from-but closely related to-that
in Heli-Coil and Blan v. Lamb. In Petteys the defendants held convertible
securities more than six months and then converted to common when a call
on the shares was issued, selling the common shares within six months of
the conversion. The district court, applying very strictly the objective stan-
dard established by Park & Tilford, held that the conversion, though in-
voluntary (defendants were directors, but had no control over the call),
and the subsequent "sale" of the common constituted a "purchase" and
"sale" under section 16(b). The case is thus diametrically opposed to the
position taken in Ferraiolo by the Sixth Circuit. The Commission has
directed the court's attention to the amendment to rule 16b-9, which "would
have an impact on the factual situations such as those in this case." See
Motion Re Amicus Curiae Participation by SEC, p. 2, Petteys v. North-
west Airlines, Inc., supra. The Commission does point out, however, that
the new rule would not apply to cases such as Petteys, where judgment has
already been rendered, but it apparently feels that the Eighth Circuit will
give weight to the new rule in its determination of the case. It seems that
the court of appeals should do this, because of the Commission's statutory
position under section 16(b), and its obvious feeling that section 16(b)
was not intended to produce liability in the ordinary security conversion
transaction.
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Criminal Law-Felony Murder-Homicide by Fright
X, in committing armed robbery of a tavern, fires a warning
shot into the ceiling to show he means business. Y, a customer in
the tavern and one of the intended victims, has a heart attack and
dies. May X be convicted of first degree murder? In State v.
McKeiver,1 a New Jersey Superior Court, applying its felony-
murder statute,2 held that this situation was sufficient to support
an indictment for first degree murder. This note will attempt to
examine the felony-murder rule, its purpose and the validity of
this extended application.
At common law the felony-murder rule was simply that a homi-
cide resulting from the perpetration or attempted perpetration of a
felony was designated as murder.' Today, the rule, as generally
codified in this country, is that a murder4 committed in the perpetra-
tion or the attempted perpetration of one of the "dangerous"
felonies5 designated by statute is a first degree offense.' There are
'89 N.J. Super. 52, 213 A.2d 320 (Super. Ct. 1965). This case has
now been terminated as the State has accepted a plea to manslaughter.
"Murder which ... is committed in perpetrating or attempting to per-
petrate arson, burglary, kidnaping, rape, robbery or sodomy, is murder in
the first degree ... ." N.J. REv. STAT. § 2A:113-2 (1953).
HOLMES, THE COMMON LAw 57-59 (1881).
' Twenty-seven jurisdictions require this "murder" threshold. ARiz. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 13-452 (1956); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 41-2205 (1964); CAL.
PEN. CODE § 189; CoLo. REv. STAT. ANN. § 40-2-3 (1953); CONN. GEN.
STAT. REv. § 53-9 (Supp. 1963); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 571 (Supp.
1964); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-4003 (1948); IOWA CODE ANN. § 690.2(1950); KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 21-401 (1964); MD. ANN. CODE art. 27,§ 410 (Supp. 1965); MAss. ANN. LAws ch. 265, § 1 (1956); Micir. STAT.
ANN. § 28.548 (1954); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 559.010 (1953); MONT. REV.
CODES ANN. § 94-2503 (1949); NEV. REv. STAT. § 200.030 (1957); N.H.
REv. STAT. ANN. § 585:1 (1955); N.J. REv. STAT. § 2A:113-2 (1953);
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40A-2-1 (1964); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-17 (1953);
N.D. CENT. CODE § 12-27-12 (1960); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 4701 (1963);
R.I. GEN. LAws ANN. § 11-23-1 (1957); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-2402(1955); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-30-3 (1953); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, §
2301 (1958); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.1-21 (Supp. 1964); W. VA. CODE ANN.
§ 5916 (1961). Other jurisdictions give the felony-murder rule a broader
coverage by designating as a first degree offense (a) "every homicide" com-
mitted during a dangerous felony, ALA. CODE tit. 14, § 314 (1959), or (b)
"every unlawful killing" during a dangerous felony, see, e.g., FLA. STAT.
ANN. § 782.04 (1965); IND. ANN. STAT. § 10-3401 (1956); N.Y. PEN. §
1044; ORE. REv. STAT. § 163.010 (1963); WAsH. REv. CODE ANN. § 9.48.030
(1961); Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 6-54 (1959).
Felony murder is considered a first degree offense in thirty-six Ameri-
[Vol. 44
HOMICIDE BY FRIGHT
two elements of felony murder: (1) the defendant must commit
or attempt to commit a "dangerous" felony, and (2) the defendant
must commit a murder. The second element generally requires
malice and causation. Upon proof of these elements the state estab-
lishes a first degree murder charge.
The first element is a limitation imposed by the purpose of the
rule-the prevention of the unintended, unpremeditated and some-
times accidental deaths that too often occur in the perpetration of
certain felonies.' Since the common characteristic of these "danger-
ous" felonies is the creation of a substantial risk to human life, the
first element is also important in establishing the second. Malice
aforethought must be exhibited by a defendant in order to charge
him with murder. This vague term was at first nothing more
definite than a general intention to commit a wrong," but it is now
considered an unjustifiable, inexcusable and unmitigated man-en-
dangering-state-of-mind.' This requisite mental state may be either
express or implied, and because of the common characteristic of a
"dangerous" felony, the courts will normally imply malice from the
felon's actions. It has been said that
this imputation is justifiable only on the assumption that the risk
of death or serious bodily harm as a consequence of a felony, or
the risk in concert with the felonious intent, is sufficient to imply
malice on the ground that the felon demonstrates that he has no
concern for human life.10
This does not mean, however, that the malice with which a "danger-
ous" felony is committed will always satisfy the murder require-
ment of the felony-murder rule, because the rule allows only malice
can jurisdictions recognizing two degrees of murder. 66 YALE L.J. 427 n.1
(1957).
o The "dangerous" felony requirement was the earliest restriction on the
application of the felony-murder rule. Powers v. Commonwealth, 110 Ky.
386, 63 S.W. 976 (1901); People v. Pavlic, 227 Mich. 562, 199 N.W. 373
(1924). The usual felonies designated today are arson, burglary, rape and
robbery. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-17 (1953) contains the language "or other
felony" and it is still an open question whether any statutory felony or
only a felony dangerous to life is intended. State v. Streeton, 231 N.C. 301,
56 S.E.2d 649 (1949).
7 MODEL PENAL CODE § 201.2, comment 4, at 37 (Tent. Draft No. 9,
1959); REPORT OF RoYAL CoMmissioN ON CAPITAL PUNISHMENT, CMD.
No. 8932, at 35-36 (1949-53).
866 YALE L.J. 427, 430 (1957).
'Perkins, A Re-Examination of Malice Aforethought, 43 YALE L.J. 537
(1934).
" 71 HARv. L. REv. 1565 (1958).
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and not the act of killing to be imputed to the felon. Causation
must still be proved." This should be only "but for" causation-a
negative concept that unless the felony causes the death, no murder
is committed.' Although there is judicial authority to the con-
trary,' 3 the recent trend of decisions is to reject an affirmative
application of proximate cause. Because of this rejection, a defen-
dant is not guilty of felony murder for justifiable homicide by a
policeman or excusable homicide by a victim committed during the
course of the defendant's felony.'4 Thus the mere coincidence of
homicide and felony is not sufficient to satisfy the requirements of
the felony-murder rule.
The establishment of these elements enables the court and the
jury to impose the severest penalty allowed by the state; this is the
real significance of the felony-murder rule. It is not the imposition
of criminal responsibility that should be criticized but rather the
degree of responsibility the rule demands. The degree of responsi-
bility was of little consequence at common law because all felonies
were punishable by death.'" But with the curtailment of capital
punishment and the division of murder, its continued characteriza-
tion as a first degree offense is of great importance. At common
law, malice aforethought was the only requirement for murder, as
it is for second degree murder today. First degree murder, to the
layman, has the additional requirement of wilful, premeditated and
deliberate action.'6 The felony-murder rule, however, relieves the
state of the difficult burden of proving this mental state characterized
by a design to kill. By eliminating inquiry into whether such design
exists,' 7 the rule greatly expands the application of first degree
1 5 SANTA CLARA LAW. 172, 176 (1964).
"2 34 N.C.L. REV. 350, 353 (1956).
"
3Ludwig, Foreseeable Death in Felony Murder, 18 U. PiTr. L. REV.
51 (1956).
"
4People v. Washington, 44 Cal. Rptr. 442, 402 P.2d 130 (1965) (dis-
approving any inconsistency in People v. Harrison, 176 Cal. App. 2d 330,
1 Cal. Rptr. 414 (Dist. Ct. App. 1959); Commonwealth v. Redline, 391
Pa. 486, 137 A.2d 472 (1958) (overruling Commonwealth v. Thomas, 382
Pa. 639, 117 A.2d 204 (1955)).1 James, The Felony Murder Doctrine, 1 Am. CRIM. L.Q. 33, 37 (1963).
1 66 YALE L.J. 427, 432-33 (1957).
' When a homicide is committed during a robbery, premeditation is not
an element, robbery being the legal equivalent thereof. State v. Akins, 94
Ariz. 263, 383 P.2d 180 (1963). Affirmative defenses to the specific intent
to kill also have no validity. E.g., United States ex rel. Rucker v. Myers,
311 F.2d 311 (3d Cir. 1962) (intoxication); State v. Pastet, 152 Conn. 81,
203 A.2d 287 (1964) (temporary insanity).
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murder and places at the disposal of law enforcement officials a
formidable weapon. Of course, it is evident that in many instances
the felon deserves the severest penalty allowed by law, as where a
robber kills his victim to prevent identification. Such punishment
could be obtained by a straight first degree murder indictment with-
out the support of the felony-murder rule. In absence of facts
establishing a wilful, premeditated and deliberate killing, as in the
principal case, the maximum offense, theoretically justifiable, would
be second degree murder. Moreover, in the rare case where
the chances of death resulting from the commission of the felonious
act is so remote that no reasonable man would have taken it into
account, only a manslaughter conviction should be sustained.'" Al-
though it is foreseeable in the perpetration of armed robbery that
violence may erupt causing death, it is arguable that in the principal
case death by heart attack is not foreseeable.' Even if the state
is able to establish factual causation through medical evidence and
the "thin skull" doctrine,20 the real question of whether liability
should attach still remains. "[T]his is a question not of causation
but of culpability. ' 2 ' However, the consideration of whether the
legislature intended to impose this severe penalty on such conduct
is excluded by operation of law, and the homicide is classified as
first degree murder. Professor Packer states that
in form, this means that absolute liability for murder is being
imposed. In substance, however, the felony-murder rule simply
relieves the jury of having to infer what can usually be inferred
with great ease, that the actor foresaw that death might result
from his conduct. The irrationality of the rule, which has long
drawn the attack of scholars, lies in the result that it compels in
'8 Perkins, supra note 9, at 560.
Such an argument is no longer strengthened by the fact that death
was not caused by corporal harm. Today, of course, most jurisdictions
impose criminal responsibility for death from fright resulting from battery
upon the deceased. E.g., Snowden v. State, 133 Md. 624, 106 Atl. 5 (1919) ;
State v. Knight, 247 N.C. 754, 102 S.E.2d 259 (1958). But jurisdictions
also impose such responsibility even though no hostile demonstration or
overt act was directed at the deceased. People v. Studer, 59 Cal. App. 547,
211 Pac. 233 (Dist. Ct. App. 1922); In the Matter of Heigho, 18 Idaho
566, 110 Pac. 1029 (1910); Graves v. Commonwealth, 273 S.W.2d 380
(Ky. 1954) (rev'd on other grounds). For a general discussion of homicide
by fright or shock, see Annot., 47 A.L.R.2d 1072 (1956).2 Although this is a tort concept, the idea that one takes his victim as
he finds him may be applicable here.21 Packer, The Modet Penat Code and Beyond, 63 CoLuM. L. l~v. 594,
603 (1963).
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the rare case in which the evidence shows the absence of culpable
foresight. It is this automatic and conchtsive imputation of cul-
pability that has been rightly criticized.22
What is the justification for such a special ban? It may be
said to be warranted as vengeance or retribution for fearful harm.
But in those felony homicides lacking the additional requirements
for first degree murder, the community would not demand the most
severe penalty and, in fact, to do so weakens the concept of first
degree murder.23 Most proponents of the felony-murder rule ex-
pound its deterrent effect.24 Even though it can be argued that the
deterrent effect is dubious, it is more important to point out that
mere increase in punishment beyond that provided for the under-
lying felony or warranted by the evidence of culpability is not the
correct method.'
One solution to this problem in any legal system is to abolish the
rule, as England and Ohio have done.26 However, this solution is
undesirable, for it ignores the valuable insight drawn from common
experience that unintended deaths too often occur during certain
felonies. Moreover, abolishing the rule is not necessary. By lower-
ing the degree of criminal responsibility imposed upon the felon,
who unintentionally "causes" a death, a rational basis may be main-
tained in attempting to prevent crime and to preserve human life.
While in the majority of cases, an enactment that embodies the
felon-murder rule within second or third degree murder 27 will
punish the offender according to his state of mind or culpability,
there still remains the rare instance where the remote death occurs
"Id. at 598.
"Morris, The Felon's Responsibility For the Lethal Acts of Others,
105 U. PA. L. tRxv. 50, 66 (1956).2, E.g., People v. Washington, 44 Cal. Rptr. 442, 447, 402 P.2d 130, 135
(1965) (dissent).
"The efficacy of punishment in preventing crime depends both on
its severity and its certainty. Centuries of common law experience
have demonstrated that certainty of punishment is more effective in
deterring potential offenders than severity. It has also demonstrated
that excessive severity may diminish certainty of punishment. This
is so because the criminal law depends for its enforcement on laymen
as complainants, witnesses and jurors.
Ludwig, supra note 13, at 61-62.
"6English Homicide Act, 1957, 5 & 6 Eliz. 2, c. 11; OHio REv. CODE
ANN. §§ 2901.01, 2901.05 (Page 1958). In the MODEL PENAL COD. § 201.2,
comment 4, at 35-36 (Tent. Draft No. 9, 1959) these two statutes are dis-
cussed in conjunction with the doctrine's rejection or nonexistence in other
foreign countries.
27 See, MINN. STAT. § 609.195 (1964).
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during a felony. Thus the best solution28 appears to be that adopted
in the Model Penal Code."9 The Code provides that homicides oc-
curring in the course of the commission of felonies "will only
constitute murder if they are committed purposely or knowingly, or
recklessly where the recklessness demonstrates extreme indifference
to the value of human life, subject, however, to a presumption of
such recklessness if the actor is committing""° one of the dangerous
felonies normally found in a felony-murder statute. This presump-
tion of extreme recklessness is rebuttable,"' and the jury may find
that the recklessness lacks extreme indifference.82 The homicide,
however, may still be adjudged reckless, in which event it consti-
tutes manslaughter.-3 In this manner, the Code recognizes and cor-
rects the real evil of the felony-murder rule, i.e., the irrelevant issue
of whether the homicide was purposely or accidentally committed. 4
The Code's effect is concisely stated by Professor Packer.
In short, the felony-murder rule is transformed from a rule of
law to a rule of evidence. The principle of wens rea, as it applies
in the law of homicide, is fully preserved, but the jury's atten-
tion is explicitly directed to the justifiable evidentiary implication
of homicide in the course of a felony.35
The results may not often differ,( but a conviction under the Code
would rest upon sound grounds.
Whether the defendant in the McKeiver case could overcome
the presumption of extreme indifference will not be discussed here.
28 One attempt at punishing according to culpability is the declaration
that homicide in the commission or attempted commission of a crime punish-
able by death or life imprisonment is first degree murder. MAss. ANN.
LAws ch. 265, § 1 (1956). Another solution that has been suggested is to
increase the penalty for the underlying felony. Morris, supra note 23, at 77.
"If the object of the rule is to prevent such accidents, it should make acci-
dental killing with fire-arms murder, not accidental killing in the effort to
steal; while, if the object is to prevent stealing, it would be better to hang
one thief in every thousand by lot." HOLMES, THE COMMON LAw 58 (1881).
" MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.2 (Proposed Official Draft 1962).
"MODEL PENAL CODE § 201.2, comment 4, at 33 (Tent. Draft No. 9,
1959).
81 Ibid.
8' MODEL PENAL CODE § 201.2, comment 2 (Tent. Draft No. 9, 1959).
8MODEL PENAL CODE § 201.2, comment 4, at 33 (Tent. Draft No. 9,
1959).
1" MODEL PENAL CODE § 201.2, comment 4, at 39 (Tent. Draft No. 9,
1959).
"Packer, supra note 21, at 599.
The Code declares that murder is a first degree felony which may have
the death sentence. MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.2(2) (Proposed Official Draft
1962).
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The writer only suggests that to impose first degree murder auto-
matically without inquiry into whether the actor had the requisite
culpability with respect to the result threatens the very foundation
of the criminal law-the principal of punishing according to cul-
pability. If the Code with its firm foundation has not been accepted,
the law enforcement officials must analyze each fact situation and if
necessary, as in the principal case, punish only the justifiable crimes
-armed robbery and manslaughter. The system should not be




In Wofford v. Highway Comm'n, 1 the North Carolina Supreme
Court abolished the doctrine of eminent domain known as the
cul-de-sac principle.2 If a public authority blocks or vacates a por-
tion of a road, leaving any owner whose land abuts the remaining
road without access from one direction, the situation is generally
called a cul-de-sac. In the 1931 decision of Hiatt v. City of Greens-
boro,8 the court held that the creation of a cul-de-sac was compens-
able under eminent domain. 4 The rationale of the court was that
the owner whose property abuts a road has a private easement to
have the street remain open in both directions, and that the damage
to abutting owners was different in kind as well as in degree from
that of the general public. The court stated that the majority of
courts agreed with this view.
Since Hiatt the court has gradually restricted the application of
1263 N.C. 677, 140 S.E.2d 376 (1965).
2 Cul-de-sac is French for "the bottom of a bag." The North Carolina
Supreme Court has defined the cul-de-sac principle as:
The rule that an abutting owner has a right of access to the
general system of streets and to the remainder of his street with all
of its connections to a point where they cease to be of more than
remote advantage to him, and that when one end of the street is closed
he is entitled .to- compensation...... -
Snow v. Highway Comm'n, 262 N.C. 169, 172, 136 S.E.2d 678, 681 (1964).
8201 N.C. 515, 160 S.E. 748 (1931).
'North Carolina has no eminent domain provision in its constitution.
However, just compensation for the taking of private property for public
use has been considered necessary under art. I, § 17 of the North Carolina
Constitution. Town of Morganton v. Hutton & Bourbonnais Co., 251 N.C.




this doctrine. In Sanders v. Town of Smithfield5 the court refused
to allow compensation when the road was obstructed in a block
other than the one on which plaintiff's land was situated. Hiatt
was distinguished on the grounds that a cul-de-sac is not created
when there is an intersecting street between plaintiff's property and
the obstruction. This distinction seems to be generally recognized
by courts which hold cul-de-sac to be recoverable.6
In Snow v. Highway Comm'ne 7 the court refused to apply the
cul-de-sac principle in a rural situation. It made no justifiable dis-
tinction between the application of cul-de-sac in urban and rural
situations. The real reason for making such a distinction apparently
was that the court did not wish to overrule Hiatt without warning.
The distinction made will not bear analysis, but the case did serve
to give warning that the end of cul-de-sac was near in North Caro-
lina. This was particularly emphasized by the last sentence of the
case: "Quaere: If the questions presented by Hiatt arise again in
this jurisdiction, should this court re-examine its holding in that
case in the light of modem conditions and the trend of recent
opinion in other States ?,,'
Within a year the Wofford case overruled the Hiatt decision.
The first principle asserted by the court by Hiatt-that the
owner had a private easement of travel in both directions-had
been considerably weakened by well-settled rules that there is no
compensation when a municipality converts a street to a one-way
street9 or places permanent divider strips between the traffic lanes.'
With all the degrees of interference that are said to be reasonable
under the police power, it is doubtful if the abutting owner has any
right to a flow of traffic by his property."' Because of this, the
-221 N.C. 166, 171, 19 S.E.2d 630, 634 (1942).
'E.g., In re Hull, 163 Minn. 439, 204 N.W. 534 (1925); Annot., 49
A.L.R. 361 (1927), 93 A.L.R. 642, 644 (1934).
1262 N.C. 169, 136 S.E.2d 678 (1964).
8Id. at 177, 136 S.E.2d at 684.9E.g., Cities Serv. Oil Co. v. New York, 5 N.Y.2d 110, 154 N.E.2d 814,
180 N.Y.S.2d 769 (1958); City of Memphis v. Hood, 208 Tenn. 319, 345
S.W.2d 887 (1961) ; Walker v. State, 48 Wash. 2d 587, 295 P.2d 328 (1956).1 E.g., Daugherty County v. Hornsby, 213 Ga. 114, 97 S.E.2d 300
(1957); Turner v. Roads Comm'n, 213 Md. 428, 132 A.2d 455 (1957);
Walker v. State, supra note 9.
" See Barnes v. Highway Comm'n, 257 N.C. 507, 126 S.E.2d 732 (1962).
It seems odd that courts holding cul-de-sac compensable would take this
position since the real damage is suffered from the loss of traffic by the
property, not from the landowner's own inability to travel in either direc-
tion.
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court decided that any damage done to an abutting owner's prop-
erty by being placed in a cul-de-sac was different only in degree
from that of the general public and not in kind. Therefore, the
damage was not compensable. The fact that the owner can now
travel only in one direction, necessitating a more circuitous route to
go in the other, is damnum absque injuria.
The above is a synopsis of the court's reasoning. However,
two reasons that were probably the real basis for the change in the
North Carolina view were unmentioned by the court: (1) the im-
practical consequences of the Hiatt rule under modern conditions,
and (2) a shift of the weight of authority on the question. It is
apparent that the theory of building roads and highways is quite
different today from what it was at the time of the Hiatt decision.
Limited access highways for rapid transit in rural and in urban
areas have become a necessity, and their costs are extremely high.
A recovery for the creation of a cul-de-sac would add considerably
to the costs. The Kansas Supreme Court, which has held cul-de-sac
to be compensable, recently recognized in dictum that "this new con-
cept [controlled access highways], which was not fully recognized
in our previous decisions, requires a complete review and reappraisal
of the correlative rights of ... owners of abutting lands"'12 and "a
present statement of public and private highway rights must reflect
prevailing conditions."' 3
In Hiatt, the court cited American Law Reports annotations
to show that its decision was consistent with the weight of author-
ity.' 4 This majority has clearly shifted.' Of the latest decisions
that could be found in the United States, twenty-three courts do
not allow recovery in the cul-de-sac situation,' and fourteen
12 Brock v. Highway Comm'n, - Kan. , , 404 P.2d 934, 939
(1965).
'
2 Id. at - , 404 P.2d at 942.
14 See Annot. 49 A.L.R. 361 (1927), 93 A.L.R. 642 (1934).
'
5 Justice Parker, dissenting in Wofford, disagrees. 263 N.C. at 685,
140 S.E.2d at 386.
"Ralph v. Hazen, 93 F.2d 68 (1937) ; Jackson v. Birmingham Foundary
& Mach. Co., 154 Ala. 464, 45 So. 660 (1908); Gayton v. Dep't. of High-
ways, 149 Colo. 899, 367 P.2d 899 (1962); Micone v. City of Middletown,
110 Conn. 664, 149 Atl. 408 (1930); Tift County v. Smith, 219 Ga. 68, 131
S.E.2d 527 (1963); Warren v. Highway Comm'n, 250 Iowa 473, 93 N.W.2d
60 (1958); Dep't of Highways v. Jackson, 302 S.W.2d 373 (Ky. 1957);
La Croix v. Commonwealth, - Mass. - , 205 N.E.2d 228 (1965);
Krebs v. Uhl, 160 Md. 584, 154 Ati. 131 (1931); Phelps v. Stott Realty
Co., 233 Mich. 486, 207 N.W. 2 (1926); Handlan-Buck Co. v. Highway
Commn'n, 315 S.W.2d 219 (Mo. 1958); State v. Hoblitt, 87 Mont. 403, 288
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do.' It is unclear in two jurisdictions previously permitting recovery
whether such is still the law."s Of the courts that have decided or
reaffirmed their positions since 1955, eleven have said there is to be
no recovery"0 while only six have held that the owner can recover.20
Therefore, it would seem that the weight of authority has shifted
and that the cul-de-sac principle is disappearing.
The courts holding that one may recover for his property's being
Pac. 181 (1930) (limited to rural roads); Fougeron v. County of Seward,
174 Neb. 753, 119 N.W.2d 298 (1963); Cram v. City of Laconia, 71 N.H.
41, 51 Atl. 635 (1901); Mayor v. Hatt, 79 N.J.L. 548, 77 At. 47 (Ct. Err.
& App. 1910) (damages not allowed in the absence of statute); State ex
rel. Highway Comm'n v. Silva, 71 N.M. 350, 378 P.2d 595 (1962); Reis
v. City of New York, 188 N.Y. 58, 80 N.E. 573 (1907) ; Wofford v. High-
way Comm'n, 263 N.C. 677, 140 S.E.2d 376 (1965); Babin v. City of
Ashland, 160 Ohio St. 328, 116 N.E.2d 580 (1953); Hyde v. Minnesota
D. & P. Ry., 29 S.D. 220, 136 N.W. 92 (1912); City of Lynchburg v.
Peters, 145 Va. 1, 133 S.E. 674 (1926); State ex rel. Woods v. Road
Comm'n, - W.Va. - , 136 S.E.2d 314 (1964) (dictum upholding pre-
vious case); Stefan Auto Body v. Highway Comm'n, 21 Wis. 2d 363, 124
N.W.2d 319 (1963). In addition intermediate courts of two states have
held that no damages were recoverable. Jarnagin v. Highway Comm'n, 5
So. 2d 660 (La. Ct. App. 1942); City of Waco v. DuPuy, 386 S.W.2d 192
(Tex. Civ. App. 1964).
"? Highway Comm'n v. Kesner, - Ark. - , 388 S.W.2d 905 (1965);
Mabe v. State, 83 Idaho 222, 360 P.2d 799 (1961); Gibbons v. Paducah &
I.R.R., 284 Ill. 559, 120 N.E. 500 (1918); Falender v. Atkins, 186 Ind.
455, 114 N.E. 965 (1917); Lacascio v. Northern Pac. Ry., 185 Minn. 281,
240 N.W. 661 (1932) (dictum following the leading case in re Hull, 163
Minn. 439, 204 N.W. 534 (1925)); Highway Comm'n v. Fleming, 248 Miss.
187, 157 So. 2d 792 (1963); Turnpike Authority v. Chandler, 316 P.2d
828 (Okla. 1957); Ail v. City of Portland, 136 Ore. 654, 299 Pac. 306
(1931); Hedrich v. City of Harrisburg, 278 Pa. 274, 122 Atl. 281 (1923);
Wolfe v. City of Providence, 77 R.I. 192, 74 A.2d 843 (1950); Sease v.
City of Spartanburg, 242 S.C. 520, 131 S.E.2d 683 (1963); Sweetwater
Valley Memorial Park v. City of Sweetwater, 213 Tenn. 1, 372 S.W.2d
168 (1963) (dictum indicating the court would follow two earlier cases);
Boskovich v. Midvale City Corp., 121 Utah 445, 243 P.2d 435 (1952); Fry
v. O'Leary 141 Wash. 465, 252 Pac. 111 (1927).
"In Bacich v. Board of Control, 23 Cal. 2d 343, 144 P.2d 818 (1943),
the court declared that an abutting landowner could recover for his prop-
erty's being placed in a cul-de-sac. However, in Breidert v. Southern Pac.
Co. 61 Cal. 2d 659, 39 Cal. Rptr. 903, 394 P.2d 719 (1964), the court
said a cul-de-sac alone would not give recovery unless there has been a
"substantial impairment" of plaintiff's access to the streets. What the court
considers a substantial impairment is not yet clear. In Bolmar v. Board
of Comm'rs, 114 Kan. 552, 220 Pac. 245 (1923), the court said there could
be recovery for cul-de-sac. But in Brock v. Highway Comm'n, - Kan.-,
404 P.2d 934 (1965), the court said it would have to re-examine its rules
in this area in the light of the modem controlled-access highway.
"' See cases from Colo., Ga., Iowa, Ky., Mass., Mo., Neb., N.M., N.C.,
W.Va., and Wis. cited in note 16 supra.
2" See cases from Ark., Idaho, Miss., Okla., S.C., and Tenn. cited in
note 17 supra.
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placed in a cul-de-sac generally base their decisions on reasoning
similar to that in the Hiatt case--i.e., that an abutting land owner
has an easement in travel on the streets and highways in both direc-
tions, and there is damage to him different in kind and in degree
from that suffered by the public generally." On the other hand,
courts holding that no recovery can be had reason much as the
court in Wofford that a person has no right to traffic in front of
his property, and that the damage to the abutting landowner is
different only in degree from damage to the general public. It is
suggested that none of these reasons is the real basis for any of
the courts' decisions. The courts' decisions are in reality a result
of a balancing of interest of the landowner, who has unquestion-
ably been damaged, with that of society in having an efficient and
safe means of transportation at the lowest possible cost. If the
cases are viewed in this manner, the reason for the shift of the
weight of authority is obvious. With the costs of building high-
ways and other means of land transportation rising and with the
shift in highway building to the limited-access road, the balance
has swung to the side of the public interest.
DENNIS JAY WINNER
Investment Securities-Duty to Register Transfer
In Kanton v. United States Plastics, Inc.,' the plaintiff, a New
York resident, was owner and holder of 10,920 shares of Class A
stock of defendant, United States Plastics, Inc. ("Plastics"), a
Florida corporation.2 Plaintiff acquired the shares while employed
by Plastics from one Scharps who, as president, "dominated and
controlled" Plastics.3 On termination of his employment, plaintiff
decided to sell the shares. The stock certificates carried a legend
"
1 Textual writers generally favor giving compensation in this situation.
E.g., 4 MCQUILLAN, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONs 358-59 (Moore, 2d ed.
1943).
1248 F. Supp. 353 (D.N.J. 1965).
'Plaintiff actually paid $27,500 for. 10,000 Class B convertible shares,
which he later converted on a share-for-share basis into an equal number
of Class A shares. In addition, 920 shares were received through stock
dividends in 1962 and 1964. Id. at 355.
'Id. at 363. Scharps was held not to be an indispensable party to this
suit, which concerns not Scharps' possible adverse claim to the shares, but
solely the question of the duty of Plastics and the transfer agent to register
transfer of the shares. Id. at 360.
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reciting that the shares had been purchased for investment purposes
and not with a view to distribution or resale.4 Plaintiff, however,
secured from the Securities and Exchange Commission a "no-action
letter" indicating that it was unlikely that the SEC would challenge
sale of these shares as a violation of the Securities Act of 1933.
On March 10, 1965, plaintiff submitted the stock certificates along
with the no-action letter to Plastics' transfer agent, a New Jersey
corporation and also a defendant. On March 24, 1965, the transfer
agent, assertedly acting under Plastics' instructions, definitively re-
fused to register transfer of the shares into the plaintiff's name and
returned the certificates. On the same day plaintiff instituted a
diversity suit seeking a mandatory injunction to compel the defen-
dants to register transfer of the shares into plaintiff's name or,
alternatively, damages measured as of March 24, 1965, the refusal
date.' The district court granted the injunction.
Initially, the court held that both defendants were properly
parties to the New Jersey suit. Although the transfer agent, a New
Jersey corporation, was no longer serving Plastics in that role, it
was still amenable to suit for its alleged defaults while functioning
as such. Plastics, as principal, was properly named since its activi-
ties in this case gave it sufficient minimum contacts with New Jersey
to subject it to an in personam judgment. Avoiding any broad
ruling that "the mere presence in .. . [New Jersey] of . .. [the
transfer agent] without more, is sufficient to subject Plastics to
personal jurisdiction,"7 the court pointed to four activities that laid
a sufficient predicate for the assertion of jurisdiction over the
Florida issuer: (1) the New Jersey transfer agent had long served
Plastics in that capacity, (2) the refusal to register transfer, on
Plastics' instructions, occurred in New Jersey, (3) Plastics had fre-
quently communicated with its transfer agent in this matter, and
(4) Plastics had agreed to indemnify the transfer agent for any
'Actually, only one certificate carried the legend, id. at 356, but in view
of the final disposition of the case, this fact is immaterial.
' Since the court held, id. at 359, that "plaintiff's claim, realistically
viewed, is not related to, and does not arise under, the Securities Acts,"
i.e., the Securities Act of 1933, 48 Stat. 74, as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-aa
(1964), and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 48 Stat. 881, as amended,
15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-hh (1964), jurisdiction rested only upon diversity and
jurisdictional amount.
' The requested damages were $327,000, the alleged value of the shares
on the refusal date, 248 F. Supp. at 356, but the court made no decision on
this point since it granted an injunction, the primary relief sought.7Id. at 359.
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loss entailed by its refusal to register transfer of these shares pur-
suant to Plastics' instructions.8 Considering the issuer's unusual
degree of intervention into the otherwise routine work of its stock
transfer agent-especially since the issuer's activities sought only to
promote interests of its controlling shareholder-the court could
properly find that the issuer's New Jersey contacts justified suing
it there without offense to "traditional notions of fair play and
substantial justice."'
This holding is particularly significant in that it allows a share-
holder seeking registration of transfer to obtain jurisdiction in at
least two states when the issuer and transfer agent reside in differ-
ent jurisdictions and when, as may often be the case, the share-
holder wishes to join both issuer and transfer agent. In the present
case, jurisdiction over the issuer was important, since the transfer
agent's resignation made it impossible for it actually to register
transfer (although not to pay damages if assessed in a proper
case), but the issuer could be compelled to take the required
action either by its own action or by instructions to its new transfer
agent. In practice, the holding here means that in the frequent
case where a issuer has or must maintain a New York City trans-
fer agent,1" the shareholder may join both of them in a suit in
federal court in the southern district of New York, at least if the
issuer's activities are sufficiently substantial in relation to the prob-
lem as the court found them to be here. However, the court properly
declined ruling on the difficult question whether maintainance of a
transfer agent is alone sufficient to make the issuer amenable to suit
in the transfer agent's jurisdiction."1
8 Id. at 360.91d. at 359.
"0 For securities listed on the New York Stock Exchange it is customary
for the issuer to maintain a transfer agent and a registrar in New York
City. Additionally, it is common practice to maintain a "local" agent in
the jurisdiction of incorporation. For example, Virginia Electric and Power
Company, whose shares are listed on the New York Stock Exchange, has
transfer agents in Richmond, New York City, and Boston.
" Relevant here is a common provision in corporation statutes that a
foreign corporation is not deemed to transact business in a state merely
because it maintains a stock transfer agent in the state, at least for purposes
of determining any obligation to obtain from the Secretary of State a
certificate of authority. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-131(b) (4) (1965).
A statute sometimes specifies that such an exemption "shall not be deemed
to establish a standard for activities which may subject a foreign corpora-




Furthermore, the federal court made several significant determi-
nations on the merits. Since suit was brought in New Jersey, where
the Uniform Commercial Code is in effect, the court properly ap-
plied Code section 8-106,12 which refers registration-of-transfer
questions to the law of the issuer's incorporating state, in this case
Florida. Finding no relevant law in Florida, where the Code had
been enacted but had not taken effect at the time of decision,"3 the
court undertook "to prophesy . . . how the Florida courts would
decide the issue if called upon to do so'' 1 and used both Code and
pre-Code common-law rules to make this prediction. Thus, the
Code is recognized as a significant source of general law, although
as it becomes effective in most of the states, there will be fewer
occasions to use it in this way, since it will be applied directly to
problems.
The transfer agent had refused to register transfer of the shares
on the ground that a stock certificate legend recited purchase for
investment rather than for resale, although plaintiff submitted an
SEC no-action letter along with the certificates. The court did not
have to determine squarely the letter's legal impact. For one thing,
as it stressed, federal criminal sanctions could not be invoked against
the transfer agent for registering transfer,' 5 since the prohibitions
of the federal securities acts relate only to the "sale"' 6 of securities,
a term that is not defined to include registering transfer of a security
after it has changed hands. Moreover, where the 1933 act has dealt
with post-sale events, such as delivering a security after sale, it
has specified them." Finally, as a policy matter, registering transfer
does not usually involve the dangers that the securities acts seek to
avert, for these dangers inhere in the actual sale rather than in the
issuer's recognition of a transferee as record owner for purposes
of, e.g., notices of meetings, dividend payouts, and other phases of
the established relationship between a corporation and its share-
holders. A second reason why the court could avoid squarely de-
termining the effect of the no-action letter is its fact-finding that
12 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 25-8-106 [hereinafter cited as UCC],
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25-8-106.
"8 248 F. Supp. at 361. The Code was apparently enacted after the court
wrote its opinion.
"' Ibid.
25 Id. at 358-59.
1048 Stat. 74 (1933), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 77b (3) (1964).
148 Stat. 77 (1933), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 77e(b) (2) (1964).
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the real reason for refusing transfer was to accommodate the wishes
of the seller, in this case Scharps.'8 Presumably because of the
increased value of the shares, the seller was seeking ways to rescind
the sale and to accomplish this putative purpose had the issuer
(which seller controlled) give instructions against registering trans-
fer. Since this was obviously not an acceptable defense, the court's
mandatory injunction implies at least this much: that a restriction
on registering transfer of shares originally acquired for investment
does not of itself suspend a duty under state law to register transfer
into a purchaser's name, where an SEC no-action letter is furnished
and no other tenable or good faith grounds to refuse registration
are present. Such an implied holding accords to the SEC no-action
letter the effect and weight normally assigned to it, without going
so far as to make it conclusive on the courts. 9 Nor would the Uni-
form Commercial Code seemingly dictate a contrary result. Code
section 8-2042o only states a negative rule that an admittedly lawful
transfer restriction is ineffective unless conspicuously noted on the
certificate; but it does not logically follow that every lawful restric-
tion conspicuously noted must always be effective or enforced. 1
Thus, for purposes of ascertaining a duty to register transfer (or
a liability for refusal), the transfer itself would appear to be "right-
ful" within the meaning of Code section 8-401.22
Finally, the court determined whether Scharps had stated an
" 248 F. Supp. at 358.
" See 3 Loss, SECURITIES REGULATION 1844 n.533, 1896 n.15 (2d ed.
1961), indicating the extent to which the SEC honors no-action letters.
Loss quotes a former SEC chairman as stating in print "there seems never
to have been 'any case where the Commission has initiated any proceedings
after a letter of this nature has been issued, provided that the letter request-
ing the "no-action" position has accurately presented all the facts."' Id. at
1844 n.533. This does not conflict with the SEC's view, quoted in the
instant case, that a no-action letter "is not binding in a court of law on the
question of the liability of an issuer for permitting a sale of its securities
without registration under the Securities Act of 1933, nor would such an
opinion preclude an issuer from maintaining that a sale of its unregistered
securities by a stockholder would be in violation of Section 5 of the Securi-
ties Act of 1933." 248 F. Supp. at 357.
"UCC § 8-204, N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25-8-204.
21 Stock transfer restrictions, including restrictions like the one in the
present case, are analyzed in Folk, Article Eight: Investment Securities, 44
N.C.L. REv. 654, 680-82 (1966); a typical "investment" restriction legend
appears at 681 n.131.
22UCC § 8-401, N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25-8-401 (1) (e). The Code imposes
a duty to register transfer only if, among other things, "the transfer is in
fact rightful.... ." For further discussion, see Folk, supra note 21, at 706-09.
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"adverse claim"'  to the security, for if so, both under the Code
and prior law, the transfer agent would be justified in delaying
registration of transfer while it investigated the claim. The court
ruled that an issuer's direction not to register transfer of particular
shares alone is not sufficient notice of an "adverse claim" as to
impose a Code duty of inquiry on the transfer agent.24 Not only
was the bare instruction not to register transfer an insufficient
identification of the "adverse claim," but even if this were enough
to create a duty of inquiry, the transfer agent failed to follow
through on the Code-approved procedure for discharging that duty
of inquiry.25 Hence, under the Code neither the transfer agent nor
Plastics was privileged in refusing to register transfer.
Alternatively, the court held, assuming the Code inapplicable,
that both Plastics and its transfer agent had a common-law duty to
register transfer. The precise ground and scope of this holding is
unclear. First, the court noted the control exerted by Scharps over
Plastics to further his personal interests in this transaction by induc-
ing refusal to register transfer. This holding may be roughly stated
as follows: that an issuer acts in bad faith and without reasonable
grounds in refusing to register transfer (or inducing its transfer
agent's refusal), if personal desires of a controlling shareholder
prompt refusal, i.e., where the issuer uses its strategic position to
promote the interests of one as against another claimant.26 Thus,
the issuer must act without favoritism or discrimination in register-
ing stock transfers. To this extent, such an obligation accords with
modern corporate law concepts imposing duties of fairness on direc-
tors, officers, majority shareholders and others in a position to exert
corporate powers. Although the court articulates these ideas under
"See UCC § 8-301(1), N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25-8-301(1), for a definition
of this term.
248 F. Supp. at 360, 362.
See UCC § 8-403, N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25-8-403, on the duty of inquiry
and methods of discharging that duty. This is discussed in detail in Folk,
supra note'21, at 699-702.
A crucial affidavit in the case
concludes with the statement that Plastics, not being able to make a"
determination with respect to the conflicting claims to the stock,
refused to allow a transfer to be made of the certificates in question.
This statement . . .on its face, presupposes an adverse claimant
dealing at arms length with the corporation of which he is a stock-
holder. But this Court cannot shut its eyes to the relationship exist-
ing between the adverse claimant and his corporation, and the latter's
conduct by reason thereof.
248 F. Supp. at 363,
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common law, they would appear equally to apply under the Code via
its requirement that issuers and transfer agents must always act
in good faith.1
7
ERNEST L. FOLK, III*
Military Law-Sixth Amendment Right to Counsel Applied
to Special Court-Martial
Petitioner in Application of Stapley,' a private first class in the
regular Army, was tried for and convicted of four violations' of the
Uniform Code of Military Justice by special court-martial convened
at Fort Douglas, Utah. He was sentenced to be confined at hard
labor for three months, to forfeit fifty-five dollars of his pay per
month for six months and to be reduced in rank to private. At the
outset petitioner requested that he be represented by a qualified mili-
tary lawyer. His request was denied, and he was told that to retain
individual civilian counsel would cost about 150 dollars. Unable to
pay that amount, he proceeded to trial represented by a captain in
the Veterinary Corps and a second lieutenant, "neither . . . [of
whom] had any experience before or with any court-martial or in
advising persons charged with offenses."3 Acting on their advice,
petitioner entered into a pretrial agreemen with the convening
authority, pleaded guilty to all charges, made no request for enlisted
members on the court, did not object at the trial to the denial of
" Under the Code, the transfer agent has a duty of good faith running
to the holder or owner of securities. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25-8-406(1) (b).
"'Good faith' means honesty in fact in the conduct or transaction con-
cerned." N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25-1-201(19). On good faith, see Folk, supra
note 21, at 708.
* Associate Professor of Law, University of North Carolina at Chapel
Hill.
'246 F. Supp. 316 (D. Utah 1965).
' UNIFORM CODE OF MILITARY JUSTICE arts. 86 (unauthorized absence),
90 (willful disobedience of a superior commissioned officer), 117 (provok-
ing speech or gestures), 123a (making, drawing or uttering check, draft
or order without sufficient funds), 10 U.S.C. §§ 886, 890, 917, 923a (1964)
[hereinafter cited as UCMJ].
'246 F. Supp. at 319.
'A pretrial agreement is an administrative procedure, or "negotiated
plea," whereby the accused agrees to enter a plea of guilty to all charges
in return for a guarantee that any sentence in excess of a stipulated maxi-




his request for counsel and said only "yes sir" or "no sir" to ques-
tions asked by the court.
Without seeking review of his conviction through military chan-
nels, petitioner applied to the Federal District Court for the District
of Utah for a writ of habeas corpus. The court issued the writ,
holding that the sixth amendment right to counsel applied to this
special court-martial. The court concluded that because the facts
involved substantial charges of moral turpitude and considerable
risk of incarceration, counsel with training beyond that common to
all military officers was required.5
The court felt that it was
appropriate, timely and necessary to recognize that it may be
repugnant to minimal requirements of due process, even in the
military service, for the juridically blind to lead the blind under
a system or in a particular command accepting this as the rule
rather than a militarily necessitated exception . . . [and that the
sixth amendment's right to] assistance of counsel, however
adaptably we may interpret the term in view of military expedi-
ency, cannot be constitutionally debased to mean the substantial
absence of any legal assistance .... 6
Within the framework of the military judicial system, the
United States Court of Military Appeals7 held in United States v.
Culp8 that the accused in a special court-martial, as distinguished
from a general court-martial,9 is not entitled to lawyer counsel.'0
5 The Justice Department did not appeal the decision. Charlotte Ob-
server, Dec. 1, 1965, p. 7A, col. 5. Apparently the thought was that Stapley
would not receive immediate acceptance in other judicial districts. See notes
34-35 infra, and accompanying text.
'246 F. Supp. at 322.
7A statutory court vested with the power of final review of courts-
martial proceedings. UCMJ art. 67, 10 U.S.C. § 867 (1964).
a 14 U.S.C.M.A. 199, 33 C.M.R. 411 (1963).
' There are three types of courts-martial: general, special and summary.
The primary difference is sentencing power. A general court-martial is
empowered to impose the maximum statutory sentence for any offense. The
special court-martial is limited in power to a sentence of six months con-
finement for any offense while the summary court-martial is limited to a
sentence of thirty days confinement for any offense. See UCMJ arts. 18-20,
10 U.S.C. §§ 818-20 (1964).
" The UCMJ requires in general courts-martial cases that every accused
be represented by free appointed military counsel, free military counsel of
accused's own choice, or by civilian counsel paid for by the accused. How-
ever in a special court-martial case, if the government is represented by a
nonlawyer (the situation in the principal case), the accused need only be
represented by "counsel" with substantially similar training-or lack thereof.
UCMJ art. 27, 10 U.S.C. § 827 (1964).
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Each of the three judges wrote separate opinions, yet all concluded
for differing reasons" that a qualified lawyer was not required.
Thus petitioner Stapley could assert no denial of "military due
process"' 2 by having been refused the services of a military lawyer
in such circumstances.
From the standpoint of civilian constitutional law, it is clear
that federal courts have habeas corpus jurisdiction over military
prisoners.'" But to what extent that jurisdiction encompasses con-
sideration of alleged denials of constitutional due process is debat-
able. In a two-step argument, petitioner Stapley first contended that
the United States Supreme Court in Burns v. Wilson, 4 while deny-
ing the writ, said that civil courts have jurisdiction to consider
due process denials if those denials are so extreme as to deprive the
inilitary tribunal of its jurisdiction.'" Secondly, he contended that
since due process now includes the right to counsel in a state criminal
trial, the military court had by denying his request for a lawyer
deprived him of such a fundamental right that it was without juris-
diction.' 6
Burns was decided in 1953 and contains four separate opinions,
" Sixth amendment right to counsel does not apply to courts-martial,
14 U.S.C.M.A. 199, 215-16, 33 C.M.R. 411, 427-28 (1963) (opinion of
Kilday, J.); sixth amendment right to counsel does apply, but appointment
of nonlawyer counsel satisfies, id. at 217, 33 C.M.R. at 429 (opinion of
Quinn, C.J.); sixth amendment right to counsel applies, but the accused is
not deprived of his rights because he chose to be defended by nonlawyer
counsel, id. at 219, 33 C.M.R. at 431 (opinion of Ferguson, J.).
" The traditional Supreme Court view is that "to those in the military
or naval service of the United States the military law is due process. The
decision, therefore, of a military tribunal acting within the scope of its lawful
powers cannot be reviewed or set aside by the courts." Reaves v. Ainsworth,
219 U.S. 296, 304 (1911). See also United States ex rel. French v. Weeks,
259 U.S. 326, 335 (1944); United States ex rel. Innes v. Hiatt, 141 F.2d
664 (3d Cir. 1944). This authority was acknowledged by the civilian court
of appeals in the Burns case hereafter discussed. Burns v. Lovett, 202 F.2d
335, 341 (D.C. Cir. 1952). The decision in Culp, supra note 11, then, has
the effect of a declaration by the Court of Military Appeals that denial of
a lawyer in a special court-martial is not a denial of military due process.
" Ex parte Reed, 100 U.S. 13 (1879).
'346 U.S. 137 (1953), rehearing denied, 346 U.S. 844 (1953).
" This argument was prompted by the basic rule that the only ground
for habeas corpus relief is lack of jurisdiction on the part of the sentencing
court. Traditionally, inquiry may extend to whether the court was legally
constituted, whether it had jurisdiction of the offense charged and of the
person tried, and whether it imposed a sentence within the maximum limits.
See AYcocK & WURFEL, MILITARY LAW UNDER THE UNIFORM CODE OF
MILITARY JUSTICE 365 & n.201 (1955).




the rationale in none of which captured the assent of more than
four justices." While Mr. Chief Justice Vinson's opinion does
seem to say that military habeas corpus jurisdiction extends to due
process denials, it is important in assessing its force in the principal
case to keep in mind the facts and the Court's holding there. Peti-
tioners were convicted of murder and rape and sentenced to death by
a general court-martial."8 The sentence was approved by the Board
of Review, the Court of Military Appeals and the President. In
an application for habeas corpus petitioners alleged, inter alia, illegal
detention, coerced confessions and denial of counsel and effective
representation. 9 The allegations concerned matters outside the
original record of trial, but all were considered upon military appel-
late review. In the eyes of one judge of the civilian court of appeals
these allegations would, if proved, have constituted a denial of
civilian due process.20 Yet the possibility of denial of due process
and the imposition of the death sentences notwithstanding, the Su-
preme Court denied the writ holding that military habeas corpus
jurisdiction included due process review only to determine whether
the military judicial system gave fair consideration to each conten-
tion raised by the petitioners.2 '
Burns does not seem to be good authority upon which to base
the decision in Stapley. That case did contain allegations of serious
due process denial and involved death sentences, but the issue of
absence of representation was not presented and the writ was
The judgment of the Court, announced by Mr. Chief Justice Vinson
and in which Justices Reed, Burton and Clark joined, affirmed the lower
court's dismissal of the application for habeas corpus on the ground that,
having found that the military had given fair consideration to petitioners'
claims, the civil court had performed its function. 346 U.S. at 144. Mr.
Justice Jackson concurred in the judgment of the Court without opinion.
Mr. Justice Minton concurred in the judgment, but on the ground that the
sole function of the civil courts is to determine whether "the military court
has jurisdiction, not whether it has committed error in the exercise of thatjurisdiction." Id. at 147. Mr. Justice Douglas, joined by Mr. Justice Black,
dissented on the ground that the civil courts had jurisdiction to review
military decisions where the military had not fairly and conscientiously
applied the Supreme Court's due process standards and that here the un-
disputed facts showed there had been a failure to properly apply those
standards. Id. at 150-55. Mr. Justice Frankfurter in a separate opinion,
neither concurring nor dissenting, felt that the case should be set down for
reargument since issues of far-reaching importance were involved. Id. at
148-50.18Id. at 138.
:' Burns v. Lovett, 202 F.2d 335, 343, 346 (D.C. Cir. 1952).
oId. at 348-53 (opinion of Bazelon, J., dissenting).
'1346 U.S. at 144.
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denied." Whatever view one takes of the subsequent expansion of
due process and the right to counsel,23 the facts in Burns, if not the
holding, drastically restrict its applicability in Stapley.
The court in Stapley recognized that the decisional basis for
petitioner's position was weak.24 Despite this, the Supreme Court's
concept of due process has expanded considerably since Burns. The
rationale in Stapley seems to be that this factor, coupled with the
increased speed and ease of transportation, the availability of mili-
tary lawyers and, although not mentioned by the court, the increased
effect of the draft in what is now a wartime situation, requires that
an accused in these circumstances 25 be given the right to representa-
tion by a trained lawyer. 6 In essence the court's conclusion is that
if the right to trained counsel is not the law, it should be. Mr.
Chief Justice Warren has given apparent off-the-bench support to
such a conclusion. In a speech at the New York University Law
Center in 19627 he commented that on the basis of Burns v. Wil-
son28 courts-martial proceedings could be challenged by habeas corpus
and that "our citizens in uniform may not be stripped of basic
rights simply because they have doffed their civilian clothes. ' 29
It is appropriate here to note that Congress has before it eighteen
proposed amendments to the Uniform Code of Military Justice de-
signed further to protect the constitutional rights of servicemen. 0
These are the result of hearings and protracted research by the
Senate Judiciary Committee's Subcommittee on Constitutional
Rights." While the amendments would substantially increase the
"- There was no denial of counsel found in Burns, since the accused were
represented by lawyers. In fact, the majority opinion of the court of appeals
decision below states that the "accused were vigorously defended at all
points." 202 F.2d 335, 347 (D.C. Cir. 1952).
2 Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
' "The precedential structure within, or upon t1e periphery of which,
these conclusions have been reached . . . are indicated in the margin." 246
F. Supp. at 321-22 (footnotes omitted). (Emphasis added.)
5 The circumstances were petitioner's youth, the frustration of his efforts
to obtain qualified legal counsel and the fact that the charges involved
claimed moral turpitude and risk of substantial incarceration. Id. at 318, 321.26 Id. at 321.
"' Warren, The Bill of Rights and the Military, 37 N.Y.U.L. REv. 181
(1962). The address was delivered as the third James Madison Lecture on
February 1, 1962.
28346 U.S. 137 (1953).29 Warren, op. cit. supra note 27, at 188.




rights of military personnel, including a requirement that the ac-
cused be represented by a lawyer before special courts-martial where
a bad conduct discharge can be awarded, 2 they would not provide
a lawyer to the accused where no bad-conduct discharge can result.
Historically the premise upon which denial of certain constitu-
tional rights to those in the military rests is that proper order and
discipline cannot otherwise be achieved.33 Nevertheless, a substan-
tial argument can be made that the guarantee of a lawyer in special
courts-martial would have little adverse affect on the maintenance
of discipline.34 One author in the field of military justice has pro-
posed to the Constitutional Rights Subcommittee that its bill to
abolish summary courts-martial be extended to include special
courts. This would insure that each military criminal prosecution
would be before a general court-martial with the due process pro-
tection there afforded, including the right to legally qualified counsel.
The present provisions for non-judicial punishment for minor
offenses would of course remain in force.
35
The problem raised in Stapley of providing legally trained coun-
sel in courts-martial is far from settled and probably will not be
resolved until the issue is presented to the Supreme Court. Subse-
quent to the principal case, the Federal District Court for the Dis-
trict of Kansas has denied an application for habeas corpus by a
serviceman who did not request a lawyer until after trial by special
court-martial. That court distinguished Stapley on the ground that
it was limited to its facts. 6 The California District Court of Ap-
peals for the Second District, however, has held that a national
" S. 750, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1965).
" Comment, Constitutional Rights of Servicemen Before Courts-Martial,
64 COLUm. L. REv. 127, 131 (1964). This is the substance of "military
exigency" to which the court alludes. 246 F. Supp. at 320. For opposing
views as to a historical basis for applicability of the Bill of Rights to the
military, see Henderson, Courts-Martial and the Constitution: The Original
Understanding, 71 HAiv. L. REv. 293 (1957); Wiener, Courts-Martial and
the Bill of Rights, 72 HARv. L. REv. 1 (1958).
"The UCMJ already expressly prohibits self-incrimination, cruel and
unusual punishments and command influence on courts-martial personnel.
UCMJ arts. 31, 55, 37, 10 U.S.C. §§ 831, 855, 837 (1964). These guarantees
have brought no discernible protest of damage to the military's capability
to maintain discipline. In this setting, the addition of the right to a lawyer
would hardly seem likely to raise difficulties.
"8 Statement of Professor Seymour W. Wurfel to the Subcommittee on
Constitutional Rights, p. 3, January 25, 1966.
" Le Ballister v. Warden, United States Disciplinary Barracks, 247 F.
Supp. 349 (D. Kan. 1965).
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guardsman tried by a summary court-martial, where no counsel is
provided, was entitled to object to such trial and to be tried by a
special or general court-martial where counsel is provided."7
Many servicemen tried by special courts-martial are young and
are draftees. In civilian life, from which they have recently come,
one's right to a lawyer has been upheld in a misdemeanor case in
which a sentence of ninety days was imposed. 8 Considering these
factors and the fact that a court-martial conviction can frequently
have effects that continue in civilian life, perhaps the military should
no longer be, in the words of the case here noted, "a constitutionally
uninhabitable wasteland beyond even the scan of the Great Writ
where the court is powerless to reach out a protective hand,"8 19 at
least as far as providing legal counsel is concerned.
PHILIP L. KELLOGG
Torts-Police Immunity-Civil Rights Arrests
The Fifth Circuit decision in Pierson v. Ray1 illustrates the pre-
dicament of police officers, both at common law and under federal
statute, with respect to liability for torts arising out of the official
scope of their authority. In Pierson police officers arrested plaintiffs,
participants in a civil rights pilgrimage, for disorderly conduct under
a Mississippi statute2 when they attempted to enter a coffee shop
in a bus terminal. They were convicted at a trial before a police
justice but on appeal to the county court, where there was a trial
de novo, were found not guilty. They then brought suit against
the arresting officers in federal district court alleging a common-law
tort claim for false imprisonment and a statutory claim for depriva-
" Application of Palacio, 48 Cal. Rptr. 50 (Dist. Ct. App. 1965). In a
special court-martial however, under the UCMJ, "counsel" need not be a
lawyer. Hence this state case does not really shed light on the principal
question of the right to legal counsel.38Harvey v. Mississippi, 340 F.2d 263 (5th Cir. 1965).
246 F. Supp. at 322.
1352 F.2d 213 (5th Cir. 1965), petition for cert. filed, 34 U.S.L. WEEK
3306 (U.S. Mar. 8, 1966) (No. 1074).
2 The statute in effect provides that whoever congregates in any public
accommodation where a breach of the peace is threatened and fails to dis-
perse when ordered to do so by any law enforcement officer is guilty of
disorderly conduct. MIss. CODE ANN. § 2087.5 (Supp. 1964).
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tion of their civil rights under section 1983 of the Judicial Code.'
A jury found for the defendants, and on appeal the Fifth Circuit
reasoned that, although the doctrine of official immunity protected
the police officers from the common-law claim,4 that defense was
not available under section 1983. However, the court concluded
from the memoranda used in organizing the pilgrimage that it
could be inferred the plaintiffs invited or consented to the arrest,
which would preclude recovery on the civil rights claim. Thus a new
trial was ordered to determine this question of fact.
The legal reasoning behind the court's decision seems unsound.'
The court was apparently struggling to find a way to prevent liabili-
ty of a police officer acting in good faith within the scope of his
authority in order to place him in a position comparable to that of
other public officers. It is well established that, in the absence of
' Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation,
custom, or usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be
subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within thejurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or
immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the
party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper pro-
ceeding for redress. REv. STAT. § 1979 (1875), 42 U.S.C. § 1983(1964).
'As is subsequently discussed, this does not appear to be the general
rule, and the court in asserting it cites its previous decision in Norton v.
McShane, 332 F.2d 855 (5th Cir. 1964). However, that case involved
federal and not state or local officials.
'The decision appears vulnerable to attack in the following manner: (1)
Even before Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 78 Stat. 243, 42
U.S.C. § 2000(a) (1964), if the plaintiffs were completely orderly, which
they were in this case, they had a legal right to eat in the coffee shop of
the bus terminal. The Interstate Commerce Act, 76 Stat. 397, 49 U.S.C. §
316(d) (1964), provides that a passenger has a federal right to be served
without discrimination in an interstate bus terminal. The Supreme Court
in 1960 interpreted the statute to mean that one was on the premises "under
authority of law" and that a state statute making it unlawful to remain
after being forbidden to do so was invalid in such a case. Boynton v.
Virginia, 364 U.S. 454 (1960). The defendants thus had no authority for
the arrest and deprived plaintiffs of a "right' secured by the Constitution
and laws. (2) Although the court in Pierson attempts to distinguish the
decision in Nesmith v. Alford, 318 F.2d 110 (5th Cir. 1963), cert. denied,
375 U.S. 975 (1964), on a procedural ground, that decision seems clearly
on point. The plaintiffs were arrested under a breach-of-the-peace statute
similar to the one involved in Pierson while they were eating with a group
of Negroes in a cafe. After acquittal on the charges the plaintiffs sued the
arresting police officers. The court held there was total lack of legal justifi-
cation for the arrest, as there was nothing that remotely resembled a breach
of the peace, and therefore the act of the officers was unlawful, the imprison-
ment false, and the defendants liable for their conduct violating rights of
freedom from unlawful arrest and freedom of association.
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federal statute, judicial,' legislative,7 and executive8 officials are
immune from suit based on wrongful conduct, where they are act-
ing within the general scope of their authority or in the discharge
of their duties. The immunity of executive officials9 has been applied
to numerous officials for many different torts.'" The law with re-
spect to subordinate executive officials, however, is inconsistent.
Many courts draw the distinction between torts growing out of
"discretionary" actions and those growing out of "ministerial" ac-
tions, holding that where official action involves the exercise of
discretion, it is protected, but where the challenged action is min-
isterial, no immunity is afforded.",
Most jurisdictions hold individual police officers personally
'E.g., Alzua v. Johnson, 231 U.S. 106 (1913); Bradley v. Fisher, 80
U.S. (13 Wall.) 335 (1871); Fraley v. Ramey, 239 F. Supp. 993 (S.D.W.
Va. 1965); Hardy v. Kirchner, 232 F. Supp. 751 (E.D. Pa. 1964); Haigh
v. Snidow, 231 F. Supp. 324 (S.D. Cal. 1964).
'E.g., Yellin v. United States, 374 U.S. 109 (1963); Kilbourn v. Thomp-
son, 103 U.S. 168 (1880).8 E.g., Barr v. Matteo, 360 U.S. 564 (1959); Spalding v. Vilas, 161 U.S.
483 (1895); Bershad v. Wood, 290 F.2d 714 (9th Cir. 1961); Papagianakis
v. The Samos, 186 F.2d 257 (4th Cir. 1950), cert. denied, 341 U.S. 921
(1951); Gregoire v. Biddle, 177 F.2d 579 (2d Cir. 1949), cert denied, 339
U.S. 949 (1950); Gamage v. Peal, 217 F. Supp. 384 (N.D. Cal. 1962).
" Spalding v. Vilas, 161 U.S. 483 (1895), is generally considered the first
decision applying the immunity doctrine to executive officials.
" E.g., Barr v. Matteo, 360 U.S. 564 (1959) (Acting Director of Office
of Rent Stabilization-malicious defamation); Norton v. McShane, 332 F.2d
855 (5th Cir. 1964) (officials of United States Department of Justice-
malicious arrest and imprisonment); Blitz v. Boog, 328 F.2d 596 (2d Cir.
1964) (government psychiatrist-false imprisonment); Bershad v. Wood,
290 F.2d 714 (9th Cir. 1961) (Internal Revenue Service officers); Papa-
gianakis v. The Samos, 186 F.2d 257 (4th Cir. 1950), cert. denied, 341 U.S.
921 (1951) (immigration officials-false imprisonment); Gamage v. Peal,
217 F. Supp. 384 (N.D. Cal. 1962) (Air Force doctor). The doctrine has
even been stretched to include a civilian supervisor of pavement maintenance
at a missile site. See Garner v. Rathburn, 346 F.2d 55 (10th Cir. 1965).
"
1 E.g., Spalding v. Vilas, 161 U.S. 483 (1895); Papagianakis v. The
Samos, supra note 10. See cases cited note 10 supra. See generally 2 HARPER
& JAMES, TORTS § 29.10 (1956). The distinction has been widely criticized
by many authorities. Judge Medina in Ove Gustavsson Contracting Co. v.
Floete, 299 F.2d 655, 659 (2d Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 374 U.S. 827 (1963)
reasoned:
There is no litmus paper test to distinguish acts of discretion . . .
and to require a finding of "discretion" would merely postpone, for
one step in the process of reasoning, the determination of the real
question-is the act complained of the result of a judgment or decision
which it is necessary that the Government official be free to make
without fear or threat of vexatious or fictitious suits and alleged
personal liability?
See generally Comment, 44 CALIF. L. Rv. 887, 888-89 (1956).
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liable for torts growing out of their law enforcement activities with-
out regard to the ministerial-discretionary distinction.12 This is pre-
sumably the result of the common-law tradition in tort making every
man responsible for the natural consequences of his own action. 3
However, why should the police officer be an exception to the gen-
eral immunity doctrine involving other public officials? The anomaly
is stretched to an even greater disparity in the situation where a
police officer is personally liable for false imprisonment that is a
result of an arrest made in good faith, whereas a judge charged
with the same tort, 4 as well as the district attorney who is alleged
to have prosecuted the person through spite and malice,'- are uni-
formally held to be immune. Hence, the action that resulted in
malicious imprisonment is immune, but the action that resulted in
good faith imprisonment leads to personal liability.
Under federal law the police officer may be in an even worse
position than at common law. Although section 1983 speaks in
terms of the liability of "every person" who under color of state law
deprives one of a federally secured right, this broad language has
been interpreted not to mean that Congress intended to abrogate
any common-law immunity afforded judicial,' legislative,' 7 or high
executive officials.'" However, where the suit involves subordinate
officials not directly participating in legislative or judicial processes,
" See, e.g., Mathes & Jones, Toward a "Scope of Official Duty" Im-
inunity for Police Officers in Damage Actions, 53 GEO. L.J. 889 (1965).
California does recognize this distinction. See, e.g., Ne Casek v. City of
Los Angeles, 233 Cal. App. 2d 131, 43 Cal. Rptr. 294 (1965).
"
8 Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961). The only area in which police
officers are afforded any protection is when they are found to be acting in
a quasi-judicial capacity and are thus deemed officers of the court. See, e.g.,
Summers v. McNamara, 239 F. Supp. 806 (D. Ore. 1965). The Fifth
Circuit clearly recognizes this principle and applied it to a codefendant in
Nesmith v. Alford, 318 F.2d 110 (5th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 375 U.S.
975 (1964).
"
4E.g., Arnold v. Bostick, 339 F.2d 879 (9th Cir. 1964); Rhodes v.
Meyer, 334 F.2d 709 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 915 (1964); Harvey
v. Sadler, 331 F.2d 387 (9th Cir. 1964); Sires v. Cole, 320 F.2d 877
(9th Cir. 1963). The court in Pierson also applied the general rule to a
codefendant. See cases cited note 6 supra.
1 See, e.g., Hurlburt v. Graham, 323 F.2d 723 (6th Cir. 1963) ; Sires v.
Cole, 320 F.2d 877 (9th Cir. 1963); Kostal v. Stoner, 292 F.2d 492 (10th
Cir. 1961); Cooper v. O'Connor, 99 F.2d 135 (D.C. Cir. 1938); Zellner v.
Wallace, 233 F. Supp. 874 (M.D. Ala. 1964).
" See cases cited note 14 supra.
"Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367 (1951).
" Norton v. McShane, 332 F.2d 855 (5th Cir. 1964).
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there is uncertainty in the law to what extent, if any, they are pro-
tected.""
The Supreme Court's decision in Monroe v. Pape20 seems to
resolve the question where local police officers are involved. Al-
though the Court did not expressly discuss the immunity concept,
the result has been interpreted as necessarily implying a rejection
of this defense as a general proposition.2 The Court, in Monroe,
went even further when it stated that individual police officers are
personally liable for violations under section 1983 without proof of
a specific intent to deprive one of a federal right as required by the
criminal sections of the statute.22 Although the facts in the case
depict a horrid example of police excess justifying liability, the
decision can place the police officer in an undesirable position, since
it may result in liability even though he may be acting in good faith
within the scope of his authority.23 This problem has led many
courts since Monroe to distinguish it on the basis of its peculiar fact
situation,24 i.e., outrageous conduct on the part of the police officers.
The decisions have expressed the idea that the actionable conduct
should be "reprehensible"" or "callous and shocking"2 before
liability should be imposed.
The basic policy advanced for application of the immunity doc-
"1Id. at 860-61. See generally Comment, 18 ARK. L. Rav. 81 (1965);
Comment, 44 CALIF. L. REV. 887 (1956).
20365 U.S. 167 (1961).
2 Cohen v. Norris, 300 F.2d 24 (9th Cir. 1962).
22 18 U.S.C. § 241 (1964). For the Supreme Court's interpretation of
the specific intent required see Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91 (1945).
2" Cohen v. Norris, 300 F.2d 24, 34 (9th Cir. 1962) pointed out that
the expanded interpretation of the statute in Monroe could lead to an open-
ing of the "flood gates" to private action brought under it but holds it is
up to Congress to change this. This warning is exemplified by the fact
that in 1945, the year of the Screws decision, the total number of private
actions brought under the civil rights statutes in federal courts was 29.
ADmIN. DIR. U.S. COURTS ANN. REP. 83, at table c-2 (1945). In the fiscal
year ending June 30, 1961, during which Monroe was decided, the number
was 270. ADMIN. DIR. U.S. COURTS ANN. REP. 238, at table c-2 (1961).
Three years later the number was 645. ADmIx. DIR. U.S. COURTS ANN.
REP. 218, at table c-2 (1964).
2" See, e.g., Striker v. Pancher, 317 F.2d 780 (6th Cir. 1963); Bowens
v. Knazze, 237 F. Supp. 826 (N.D. Ill. 1965); Raab v. Patacchia, 232 F.
Supp. 71 (S.D. Cal. 1964); Beauregard v. Wingard, 230 F. Supp. 167
(S.D. Cal. 1964); Selico v. Jackson, 201 F. Supp. 475 (S.D. Cal. 1962).
See generally, Shapo, Con.stitutional Tort: Monroe v. Pape, and The
Frontiers Beyond, 60 NW. U.L. REv. 277 (1965).
2" Striker v. Pancher, 317 F.2d 780, 784 (6th Cir. 1963).
" Raab v. Patacchia, 232 F. Supp. 71, 94 (S.D. Cal. 1964).
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trine to public officials is to promote fearless performance of duty. 7
To permit a citizen to have an action for damages where a police
officer is acting in good faith undermines this basic policy.2" The
threat of personal financial liability hanging over the police officer
in the performance of official duty is a continual and substantial
deterrent to effective law enforcement. As one writer has stated:
"Confronted with such a delicate choice and personal responsibility
for its correctness, it would not be surprising if police officers gen-
erally decided to err on the side of caution and think of home and
family instead of the public interest in law enforcement."' 9
It can also be said that where the conduct of the police officer is
not found to be outrageous but rather a good faith performance of
his duty, the real grievance is against the state or municipality that
employs him. However, with regard to suits under section 1983,
the Monroe decision unanimously rejected the idea that Congress
intended to bring municipal corporations within the purview of the
statute, thus unfortunately blocking one possible solution to the
problem. 0
The Pierson decision also illustrates another predicament of the
police officer. The state statute authorizing the defendants to make
the arrest was subsequently declared unconstitutional."1 Should the
police officer who acts in an otherwise nontortious manner but under
the authority of a presumptively valid state statute be liable for his
actions if the statute is subsequently declared unconstitutional? The
majority of jurisdictions still hold the police officer liable on the
theory that an unconstitutional statute imposes no duty on officials
to enforce it and affords no protection to anyone acting under
authority of it. 2 However, a growing number of jurisdictions, 33
"' Gregoire v. Biddle, 177 F.2d 579 (2d Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 339
U.S. 949 (1950).
28 See generally, Jaffe, Suits Against Government Officers: Damage Ac-
tion, 77 HARV. L. REv. 209 (1963).
" Mathes & Jones, supra note 12, at 898.
8 Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961).8 Thomas v. Mississippi, 380 U.S. 524 (1965). The court cited Boynton
v. Virginia, 364 U.S. 454 (1960), as the basis for its per curium decision.
See note 5 supra.
" E.g., Norton v. Shelby County, 118 U.S. 425 (1886); Miller v. Stinnett,
257 F.2d 910 (10th Cir. 1958); Smith v. Costello, 77 Idaho 205, 290 P.2d
742 (1955).
.. E.g., Manson v. Wabash R.R. Co., 338 S.W.2d 54 (Mo. 1960);
Yekhtikian v. Blessing, 90 R.I. 287, 157 A.2d 669 (1960); Bricker v. Sims,
195 Tenn. 361, 259 S.W.2d 661 (1953); Wichita County v. Robinson, 155
Tex. 1, 276 S.W.2d 509 (1954).
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including Mississippi, 4 have reached the opposite, and sounder, re-
sult. In Bowens v. Knazze,m an action brought under section 1983,
a federal district court reasoned that
the retroactive application of the judgment of a court as to the
requirements of the Constitution-based not on community stan-
dards but on legal reasoning-would place a defendant in an im-
possible position.
It would require law enforcement officers to respond in
damages every time they miscalculated in regard to what a court
of last resort would determine constituted a invasion of constitu-
tional rights, even where, as here, a trial judge-more learned
in the law than a police officer- held that no such violation oc-
curred.36
This appears to be the more reasonable approach.17
In all the situations mentioned above, the balance between the
need for fearless performance of duty on the part of police officers
wihtout fear of harassment and the corresponding need for satisfy-
ing the loss of an injured party would best be achieved by a finding
of no liability where an officer acts in good faith within the scope
of his authority."' It would seem that the Fifth Circuit in Pierson
could have established a far more sound and workable criterion
for the future by adopting this approach. This would mean that if
the defendants were in fact acting in bad faith, then liability would
be imposed; however where the officer was acting in good faith,
there would be no liability. The question of bad faith would be
for the trier of fact. Instead the court bases its decision on the
specious reasoning that the plaintiffs by going on the pilgrimage
consented to an illegal arrest. There seems to be little justification
for such a statement either on the facts of the case" or on the law.4"
JAMEs A. MANNINO
,Golden v. Thompson, 194 Miss. 241, 11 So. 2d 906 (1943).
"237 F. Supp. 826 (N.D. Ill. 1965).
"Id. at 829.
California has recently adopted this position in statutory form. See
CAL. GOVT. COPE § 820.6.
" See the excellent discussion in Mathes & Jones, supra note 12.
" The pertinent facts given are that the plaintiffs in letters between
themselves discussed the length of time they would remain in jail and made
arrangements for bail bonds and counsel. In one of the communications it
was said: "All in all, I think you can count on becoming familiar with
the Jackson jail . . ." The court held that from this a jury could find
that the plaintiffs consented to the arrest. This seems a doubtful conclusion
from the evidence. It seems more doubtful that a jury should be able to
question the motive of one exercising a constitutional right.
"'The only cases cited by the court for this proposition involved the
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Wills-"Next of Kin"-Time of Determination
In Central Carolina Bank & Trust Co. v. Bass,' a residuary
clause in a will posed serious constructional problems for the North
Carolina Supreme Court. The residuary estate was given in trust
and was to be divided between a son's fund and a granddaughter's2
fund.' Basically it was provided that the incomes from the funds
were to go to the son and the granddaughter in the trustee's discre-
tion,4 and the principal of the granddaughter's fund was to be paid
to her when she reached twenty-five years of age. Upon the son's
death, any principal that might be remaining6 in his fund was to be
paid and delivered over to the testator's "next of kin.'
7
general rule that consent to accompany an officer to the police station to
clear a matter up would bar any right to redress should the confinement
subsequently be determined groundless. This appears distinguishable from
the Pierson situation. See State v. Moore, 174 So. 2d 352 (Miss. 1965).
1265 N.C. 218, 143 S.E.2d 689 (1965).2 The granddaughter was not the natural born child of the testator's son,
and it was unsettled whether the testator knew of this fact at the time of
his death. Id. at 232, 143 S.E.2d at 699. However, in prior litigation it
had been determined that the child qualified as beneficiary regardless of
any misrepresentations that were made to the testator, and subsequently the
child was treated as the testator's granddaughter. Id. at 225, 143 S.E.2d 694.
' "To divide said residuary estate into two parts, one such part to
consist of three-fifths (3/5) of said residuary estate and to be known
and designated as 'Thomas L. Shepherd Fund' and the other such
part to consist of two-fifths (2/5) of the said residuary estate and to
be known and designated as 'Annie Moore Shepherd Fund.'"
rd. at 221, 143 S.E.2d at 690.
'"[T]he net income... to the said Thomas L. Shepherd and/or the
said Annie Moore Shepherd . . . in such proportions, either part to
each or all to one, as the said Trustee may, in its sole ... discretion
consider best calculated to achieve the purposes hereinafter set out."
Ibid.
"Upon and after the death of Thomas L. Shepherd or Annie Moore
Shepherd the net income thereafter arising from that part of the
trust estate not distributable upon the death of that one of them so
dying shall be paid to the survivor . . . so long as he or she shall
live and any part of the trust estate shall continue in the hands of
the trustee as hereinafter provided."
Id. at 221; 143 S.E.2d at 691.
' It was further provided that if the granddaughter should die before
reaching twenty-five years of age, the principal would go to "her child or
children then living . . . but if there be no such child or children then
living," the principal was to -go to the testator's next of kin. Id. at 222,
143 S.E.2d at 691.
'The trustee was given the discretion to make distributions from the
son's principal to the son upon certain conditions. Id. at 222, 143 S.E.2d
at 692.
"Upon the death of my son.., the Trustee shall pay and deliver over
the entire principal of the 'Thomas L. Shepherd Fund' . . . to my next of
kin .... " Id. at 222, 143 S.E.2d at 691.
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The testator died in 1939 and was survived by the son, the grand-
daughter, three sisters, and the issue of a brother and a sister who
predeceased him. In 1950 the granddaughter reached twenty-five
years of age, and the trustee distributed to her the corpus of her
fund. On July 14, 1963, the son died leaving neither widow nor
issue. Conflicting claims 8 subsequently arose, and the trustee insti-
tuted this action in the superior court under the Declaratory Judg-
ment Act.9
On appeal,1" there were three questions:
(1) When the testator directed the trustee to distribute the re-
mainder as then constituted "to my next of kin," did he mean
his nearest of kin or those who would take from him under the
statute of distributions? (2) Did testator intend to include...
[the] granddaughter ... in the class he designated as 'my next
of kin'? (3) Are 'my next of kin' to be ascertained at the death
of the testator or at the death of the life beneficiary?"
In answer to the first question, the court determined that the
words "next of kin" mean "nearest of kin." There is strong author-
ity in North Carolina12 and elsewhere 3 in support of this conclusion.
'The conflicting claims arose from the following interests: (1) the
granddaughter's contention that she should receive all the corpus and ac-
crued income from the son's fund; (2) the contention of sole legatee under
the son's will that he should get all income accrued before the son's death;
(3) the contention of nieces and nephews of the testator that they should
get the son's fund "to the exclusion of the issue of their deceased brothers
and sisters," id. at 228, 143 S.E.2d at 696; and (4) the testator's grand-
nieces' and grandnephews' contention that "my next of kin" referred to
persons living on the son's death "who are issue of testator's brothers and
sisters." Ibid.
'N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-253 (1953).
10 The lower court concluded that the testator did not intend for either
the son or the granddaughter to be included as his next of kin and that the
testator used the term "my next of kin" to designate those who would
take under the intestate succession laws at the time of the son's death.
It also concluded that the granddaughter should get undistributed net income
that accrued prior to the son's death. The appealing parties are the grand-
daughter, the son's legatee, and the nieces and nephews of'the testator who
were living on July 14, 1963. - "
'
1
.Central Carolina Bank & Trust Co. v. Bass, 265 N.C. 218, 230-31,
143 S.E.2d 689, 698 (1965).
" E.g., Wallace v. Wallace, 181 N.C. 158, 106 S.E. 501 (1921), where
the court said that "on this question it has been held in this jurisdiction,
in a long line of cases in which the question was directly considered, that
these words mean 'nearest of kin' . . . ." Id. at 163, 106 S.E. at 504.
"E.g., Williams v. Fulton, 4 Ill. 2d 524, 123 N.E.2d 495 (1954) ; Clark




Though this appears to be the general rule,14 some jurisdictions
hold that reference in a will to the testator's "next of kin" indicates
those who would take by intestacy under the statute of distribution,
and not the nearest relations in blood to the deceased." A caveat
to the North Carolina approach is that if a contrary intent is shown
by the terms of the instrument, that intent, rather than the rule
of construction, will prevail.1 6 Indicia of a contrary intent are indi-
cated in the following quote:
If to the words "next of kin" these words had been added,
"as in case of intestacy" or "as by the statute of distributions,"
or if the language of that statute had been adopted, "to the next
of kin in equal degree, or to those who legally represent them,"
we might have included the grandchildren; but upon the words
"next of kin," simply, they cannot be included.17
What are the consequences of holding that the words "next of
kin" mean "nearest of kin?" The court in the principal case con-
cluded that this prohibited operation of the principle of representa-
tion.18 Thus, for example, a brother or sister would take to the
exclusion of the children of a deceased brother or sister."0 Further,
though not mentioned in the principal case,2" the North Carolina
court has consistently construed "nearest of kin" to mean "nearest
of blood kin."'" This means that relationship by marriage is not
within the scope of "nearest of kin," and thus a surviving husband
or wife will be excluded 22 unless a contrary intention is shown.23
1' See, e.g., Redmond v. Burroughs, 63 N.C. 242 (1869). See generally
57 Ams. JuR. Wills §§ 1375-76 (1948).
"E.g., Union Trust Co. v. Kaltenbach, 353 Mo. 1114, 186 S.W.2d 578
(1945). See Annot., 32 A.L.R.2d 296, 307 (1953).
" Central Carolina Bank & Trust Co. v. Bass, 265 N.C. 218, 231, 143
S.E.2d 689, 698 (1965). "[A] court should not put rules of construction
into competition with an intent which is clearly and fully found." ATIcI-
sox, WILLs § 146 (2d ed. 1953).
" Simmons v. Gooding, 40 N.C. 382, 390 (1848).
18265 N.C. 218, 231, 143 S.E.2d 689, 698 (1965).
1" See, e.g., Knox v. Knox, 208 N.C. 141, 179 S.E. 610 (1935); Redmond
v. Burroughs, 63 N.C. 242, 246 (1869). See generally 95 C.J.S. Wills § 682
(1957).
" Evidently because the court was not faced with a blood relation problem.
21 E.g., Wallace v. Wallace, 181 N.C. 158, 106 S.E. 501 (1921); Jones
v. Oliver, 38 N.C. 369 (1844). See Annot., 32 A.L.R.2d 296, 305 (1953).
" Jones v. Oliver, 38 N.C. 369 (1844).
28 "This Court has repeatedly held that the intent of the testator is the
polar star that must guide the courts in the interpretation of a will." 265
N.C. 640, 644, 144 S.E.2d 857, 860 (1965). See generally 57 Al!. JUR. Wills
§ 1376 (1948).
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Principle-of-representation and nearest-of-blood-kin questions of re-
cent vintage should be approached cautiously in light of North Caro-
lina's new Intestate Succession Act.24 Though the principle of
representation is still recognized for some purposes in the new pro-
visions,25 there are interesting questions that would appear to pose
serious problems for the North Carolina courts when faced with
these inquiries in a will executed subsequent to July 1, 1960.2"
In regard to whether the granddaughter should be included
among the "next of kin," the court answered in the negative. The
court in reaching that conclusion first decided that the testator also
intended to exclude the son from that class. The fact that a prior
taker is at the death of the testator a member or the sole member
of the class to which a limitation over is made is not in itself enough
to exclude the prior taker from participating in the gift over.27 The
court in the principal case appropriately considered additional fac-
tors2" and clearly seems to have arrived at the testator's real inten-
tion.
It has been stated that where the prior taker is a next of kin
N.C. GEN. STAT. ch. 29 (Supp. 1965).
See generally McCall, North Carolina's New Intestate Succession Act,
39 N.C.L. REv. 1 (1960).
"The new provisions became effective July 1, 1960, and abolished the
distinction between real and personal property as to those who take by
intestate succession. Since the phrase "next of kin" was peculiarly applicable
to the distribution of personal property, perhaps in the light of the new
law consideration should be given to revising the meaning of the phrase.
Also, the new provisions make the wife a statutory heir. Ibid. See Mc-
Cain v. Womble, 265 N.C. 640, 144 S.E.2d 857 (1965). This case was
decided subsequently to the Bass case, but involved a will executed prior to
1960. The court repeated its position by saying, "For at least 120 years
... the words 'next of kin' have had a well-defined legal significance .....
Id. at 645, 144 S.E.2d at 861.
" See, e.g., Thomas v. Castle, 76 Conn. 447, 56 Ati. 854 (1904); Smith
v. Winsor, 239 Ill. 567, 88 N.E. 482 (1909). See also Annot., 13 A.L.R.
615 (1921).
The testator imposed several restrictions on the trustee's discretion to
pay any part of the principal to the son before the son's death. The testator
prohibited payment from the principal for five years after his death and at
anytime after his death that the son filed a suit disputing the fifth article
of the residuary clause. Also, no amount of the income was to be paid to
the son if such payment would discourage a sober life. The son had a
serious drinking problem, which was well known to the testator. The prin-
cipal of the granddaughter's fund was to go to the testator's "next of kin"
and not to his son specifically if the granddaughter died before reaching
twenty-five without children surviving her. These factors were considered
by the court in determining intent. Central Carolina Bank & Trust Co. v.
Bass, 265 N.C. 218, 232-33, 143 S.E.2d 689, 699 (1965).
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and there has been a limitation over to the next of kin, two ques-
tions arise:
First, whether such circumstance supports the inference of an
intention that the members of the class to take under the gift
over are to be ascertained upon the termination of the particular
estate, rather than at the time of the testator's death; and second,
whether, where the class is to be ascertained at the death of the
testator, the first taker is to be excluded from taking as a mem-
ber of the class.29
In Bass, the court stated similar issues in the opposite sequence.3
By loing so, it seems that the court used a more appropriate order
of determination because, as will be shown later, the intent to ex-
clude the first taker from the class is an important factor in deciding
when to determine the next of kin.
The third question posed in the Bass case-the time next of kin
are to be ascertained-seems to have presented the most difficulty.
There are two general rules of construction in this area. First, in
the absence of a contrary intent, "where the gift is to the heirs or
next of kin of another than the testator it ordinarily refers to the
death of such other. ... 1 Secondly, and also in the absence of a
contrary intent, "the death of the testator is the time at which the
members of a class are to be ascertained in case of a gift to the
testator's .. .next of kin. .. *"2 The second rule is the one of
concern in the principal case.
What are the factors in the present case that show an intention
contrary to the general rule, i.e., that the class should be determined
at the death of the life tenant? The court pointed out the following
factors: (1) the provision in the residuary clause that upon certain
conditions the trustee could make payments to the son from the
principal; (2) the testator instructed the trustee to "pay and deliver
over"33 the principal of the son's fund to the testator's next of kin
upon the son's death; (3) the son, at the testator's death, was the
only member of the class designated in the gift over, i.e., next of
kin; (4) the court's determination that the son was excluded from
'
9 Annot., 13 A.L.R. 615, 616 (1921).
'
0 Supra note 11.
"Witty v. Witty, 184 N.C. 375, 379, 114 S.E. 482, 484 (1922).
'
2 Ibid. A reason given for this rule is the preference for early vesting
of estates. SimEs, FUTURE INTERESTS § 80 (1951).
"8 Central Carolina Bank & Trust Co. v. Bass, 265 N.C. 218, 222, 143
S.E.2d 689, 691 (1965).
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the next of kin; and (5) if the son should subsequently have a child
born to him, the testator would probably prefer the child to have
the whole principal rather than to share it with the estates of deceased
sisters who survived the testator.
According to the court's analysis, none of the above factors alone
would be sufficient to overcome the general rule of construction.
Also, factors (1) and (2) together would not be sufficient.14
Further, standing alone, factor (3) plus the use of words of plurality
in designating the class to take the gift over would not be sufficient.35
The court held that the next of kin should be determined in this
case at the death of the son. Thus, what combination of factors
was sufficient to overcome the general rule? It appears that it re-
quired all of the above listed factors and that if factor (3) had been
missing, the court would have reached a contrary result."0
In utilizing this factor type of analysis, the court followed the
general approach to the problem37 and appears to have reached a
sound result. The court possibly indicated that in a similar situa-
tion, it might reach the same result with less factor analysis. After
indicating that "my nearest of kin" cannot mean "my next nearest
of kin," the court made the following statement:
Where the remainder is limited to a testator's next of kin, i.e.,
his nearest of kin, and where the life tenant is himself the sole
nearest of kin, it seems to us impossible to determine the takers
of the remainder during the life tenancy, if the life tenant is him-
self to be excluded.38
In other words, if the determination were made before the life
tenant's death, the next nearest of kin and not the nearest of kin
"" Id. at 239, 143 S.E.2d at 704.
"Id. at 241, 143 S.E.2d at 705.
"In form and phraseology the devise under consideration here is in-
distinguishable from that in Witty v. Witty ... and, but for the fact
that the life tenant here was the sole representative of the class,
testator's next of kin, this case would in fact be indistinguishable
from Witty v. Witty. This fact, however, makes the difference be-
tween the vested remainder in Witty and the contingent remainder
here.
Id. at 242, 143 S.E.2d at 706. There may be some doubt whether Witty v.
Witty, 184 N.C. 375, 114 S.E. 482 (1922), involved all the factors the court
said it did.
" Annot, 49 A.L.R. 174 (1927). Another factor mentioned in this
annotation that the court failed to consider directly in Bass is that at
the death of the testator an alcoholic would have been the sole member
of the class to take the gift over.
" Central Carolina Bank & Trust Co. v. Bass, 265 N.C. 218, 242, 143
S.E.2d 689, 706 (1965).
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would be determined. Such a rule might save a great deal of judicial
effort, but it also might be hard to reconcile with the preference for
vestedness39
JAmES L. NELSON
' "The law favors the construction of a will which gives to the devisee
a vested interest at the earliest possible moment that the testator's language
will permit." Elmore v. Austin, 232 N.C. 13, 19, 59 S.E.2d 205, 210 (1950).
